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EXPLAINING GENDER GAP IN LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION
Gender  gap  in  labor  force  participation  has  varied  strongly  between  countries  and  time. 
Despite constant narrowing of the gap over the last 40 years, it still persists in practically 
everywhere. Closing the gender gap in participation should be seen as an important goal, as 
working and gaining income can empower women both within their households and in the 
society. It can also improve children's welfare and the efficiency of the economy as a whole. 
The  purpose  of  this  study  is  thus  to  assess  both  the  theoretical  and  empirical  literature 
conducted  on the  topic  and to  evaluate  the  role  and importance  of  different  factors  with 
empirical analysis.
Changes  in  women's  labor  force  participation,  and  consequently  in  the  gender  gap  in 
participation,  have  been tried to  explain  in  a  multitude of  ways.  Models  of  labor  market 
discrimination see the gap mainly as a result of employer discrimination which can take place 
in the form of dislike or using group proxies to maximize profits. Discrimination can lead to a 
situation  where  the  disadvantaged  group  lowers  its  human  capital  investment,  therefore 
perpetuating  their  position.  Detecting  discrimination  empirically  remains  difficult.  Classic 
models  of  labor  supply see  participation  mainly as  a  matter  of  gaining  sufficient  wages. 
Although the narrowing of the gender  gap in  wages  can historically explain some of  the 
narrowing  of  the  gap  in  participation,  its  impact  seems  to  be  in  decline  in  the  OECD 
countries. Household models explain labor market differences between men and women by 
either utility maximization for the whole household, or by the result of a bargaining game 
within the household. Participation choices at a certain point of time can have ramifications 
for  the  future  participation,  as  well  as  on  decisions  concerning  fertility  or  divorce. 
Government  policy can  also  influence  gender  gap in  participation  through the  system of 
taxation, parental leave policies or by subsidizing child care. Moving from a system of family 
taxation to individual taxation seems empirically the most efficient way of doing this. The 
advancement of technology in various fields has also served to improve women's participation 
by improving household productivity, control over lifetime employment and maternal health. 
Finally, recent research suggests that identity and culture are also important determinants of 
participation decisions.
Empirical work, based on country-level data provided by OECD and Eurostat, requires us to 
take  both  heteroskedasticity  and autocorrelation  into  account  when conducting  regression 
analysis. Clustering standard errors for countries is the best way to do this in this case. Results 
from the regression analysis  indicate that gender gap in primary education, availability of 
part-time work, government spending on day care, as well as marriage and divorce rates are 
the  most  important  factors  explaining  variation  in  gender  gap  for  a  group  of  European 
countries between the years 1994 and 2006. Closing the gender gap in primary education by 
supporting  women's  educational  attainment  is  the  most  important  measure  to  be  used  in 
closing the gender gap in participation.
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1 Introduction
Men and women have historically been seen as having different tasks in the household and in 
the paid labor market. Women have been held responsible for taking care of the household 
chores, causing them to work mainly within the confines of their homes. Men, on the other 
hand, have been more likely to work outside the household for monetary compensation. In the 
course of the 20th century, these differences have begun to disappear. Even though women 
have become more prominent in the labor markets, a marked difference in the labor force 
participation rates (LFPRs) still persists between the two genders. Furthermore, despite the 
nearly universal narrowing of the gender gap in the last 30 years or so, the gap still varies 
considerably across counties. Therefore, this paper will seek to explain what has driven the 
gender  gap down,  what  factors  are  behind its  variation  across  countries,  and why it  still 
persists almost everywhere. A better understanding of the factors behind the gender gap will 
allow us to pursue greater gender equality in the future.
The potential benefits from closing the gender gap in LFPRs are numerous, especially if it is  
done by increasing women's participation. For example Blau (1998) gives three reasons why 
increased labor force participation can be seen as advantageous for the women themselves. 
First,  an  increase  in  the  number  of  female-headed  families  and  single  person  female 
households has created a group of households whose well-being is strongly dependent on their 
participation in the labor markets. Second, earning an income increases women's bargaining 
position inside the household, thereby affecting the distribution of resources. Thus, making 
women less dependent on their husbands' income can also give them a more equal footing in 
making  other  household  decisions.  Third,  the  level  of  participation  is  related  to  the 
accumulation of work experience which is an important determinant of the wage. Increasing 
participation could therefore be an important factor in closing down the gender wage gap.
Besides individual benefits, increasing women's participation can also have implications for 
the society. First, there is some evidence that enhancing women's economic position through 
access to paid labor could bring benefits in the form of better nutrition and welfare for their 
children (Duflo 2003, 2005). Increased presence in the labor markets could also lead to an 
increase  in  the  proportion  of  women  taking  part  in  political  representation  (Iversen  and 
Rosenbluth 2008). Increasing women's labor market participation could increase economic 
efficiency,  assuming that  their  skills  are underutilized at  the present time (Dollar  & Gatti 
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1999). Besides instrumental benefits one can also argue that equal access to labor markets is a 
goal worth pursuing by itself, as it is related to gender equality in general.
It should be remembered, however, that an increase in women's labor force participation is not 
necessarily beneficial for women. For example, increased working in young age can prevent 
access to education, decreasing the future earnings potential (Sundaram and Vanneman 2008). 
Extended market work can also strongly decrease women's leisure time, if the increasing work 
time does not decrease the time spent on household work. It is also possible that women are  
not able to keep hold of the income they earn, but instead are forced to turn it over to their 
husbands.  Women  would  thus  carry  the  costs  of  working  without  enjoying  its  benefits.  
Furthermore, participating in the labor markets can incur significant costs and risks, such as 
traveling costs or entitlement risks, which are not visible in labor force participation figures 
(Elson 1999).
If  the  benefits  from closing  the  gender  gap  in  participation  are  seen  as  greater  than  the 
potential  problems, looking into the factors behind the gap is clearly desirable. Gaining a 
better understanding of the reasons behind the gender gap in LFPRs will give us a better idea 
on  how  to  close  the  gap,  and  what  is  the  most  efficient  way  of  doing  so.  A  better 
understanding of how labor markets are gendered will also give us insight on how changes in 
policy instruments can affect the gender gap without actually meaning to do so. For example, 
understanding  the  relationship  between  maternal  leave  policies  and  mother's  employment 
allows us to assess the impact of the proposed extension of minimum maternity leave in the 
European Union (e.g. European Parliament 2010) on mothers' labor supply.
The objective of this thesis is thus to explain the variation of the gender gap in labor force  
participation rate. Three main questions arise related to certain trends in the gender gap which 
will be presented in the second chapter of this thesis. First, how can we explain changes in the 
gender  gap over  time? Second,  how can we explain  difference  in  the  gender  gap across 
countries? Third and finally, why does the gender gap still persist in almost all countries of the 
world? We will seek to answer these questions by considering a wide variety of theoretical 
and empirical research related to the topic. To assess the findings from the literature, empirical 
estimation will also be conducted on the evolution of the gender gap in participation for a 
group of OECD countries. The main contribution of this piece of research is thus twofold. 
First,  it  will  seek bring together  topics  from different  branches of  economic research,  all 
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relating to  the gender  gap in  labor  force participation.  Labor economics  has  mostly been 
interested on how topics such as labor market discrimination, wage differentials or human 
capital affect the labor market equilibrium. These topics will be complemented by research 
from issues relating especially to women's position in the labor markets such as how having 
children affects labor supply, or whether the government can influence the gap through policy 
instruments.  We will  also consider  recent  research  concerning the impact  technology and 
preferences have on labor supply. Besides drawing together a diverse field of research, the 
second major contribution of this paper will be in looking at these issues in a cross-country 
perspective, as opposed to the more usual concentration on a single country. 
As this paper seeks to cover a wide range of factors relating to the gender gap in LFPRs, it is  
clear that all the research cannot be discussed to the level of smallest detail. Therefore, when 
commenting on the previous empirical research we will be mainly concerned with results. 
Only if  the results  from different pieces of research are contradictory,  we will  pay closer 
attention  to  the  methodology.  Another  limitation  to  this  paper  is  its  concentration  on the 
gender gap in highly industrialized countries which lie mostly in the North America or in the 
Western  Europe.  After  the  second chapter,  little  is  said  about  the  situation  in  developing 
countries or countries in transition. This limitation is mainly caused by the availability of 
former research, and in the empirical estimation by the availability of data. Within the highly 
industrialized countries, research conducted in the United States is most prevalent, and we 
should  remember  that  these  results  are  not  necessarily  generalizable  to  the  different 
institutional settings in Europe. Furthermore, this paper is time-wise rather limited, mainly 
dealing with research and data from the 1980s onwards. Again, this is mainly caused by the 
unavailability of data from the time periods further back1.
The structure of the study is as follows. In the second chapter, I will present some trends on 
the gender gap in LFPRs, disaggregating the data both geographically and with respect to 
income. This should help to illustrate how large the differences in labor market participation 
are between men and women, as well as give some information as to what types of countries 
tend to have especially wide or narrow gaps. Chapter three begins by presenting economic 
models  of  discrimination  in  the  labor  markets.  These  models  seek  to  explain  the 
circumstances under which employers will prefer to hire employees from a certain group over 
1 This is an issue in most of the other empirical research as well. The comprehensive research conducted by 
Goldin (1990) on women in the United States can be singled out as one of the rare exceptions in this respect, 
as it reaches out back to the 19th century.
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some other group, such as men over women. Both models of taste for discrimination and 
statistical  discrimination  are  dealt  with.  Whereas  theories  of  discrimination  are  more 
concerned with demand for labor, we will next move on to look at the possible reasons behind 
the differences in supply for labor between men and women. Models concerning wages, non-
labor income and human capital will open up this chapter, to be followed by discussion on 
how division of labor within the household can be an important factor in determining the 
gender gap in LFPRs. The effect of fertility on women's labor supply will also be considered 
here,  as  it  is  arguably  the  only non-social  factor  differentiating  men  from women.  Fifth 
chapter will consider how policy instruments, technology and informal institutions can affect 
the gender gap. Empirical analysis on the gender gap will be conducted in the sixth chapter, to 
be followed by some final conclusions.
2 Differences in Gender Gap in Labor Force Participation Rates
This chapter will briefly look into how gender gap in labor force participation differs across 
countries, regions, and over time. We shall begin by defining the term. Formally, labor force 
participation rate describes the ratio of employed and unemployed of working age people to 
the whole working age population. When we want to look at the difference in labor force 
participation between men and women, we simply extract the female LFPR from the male 
LFPR, thus giving us the gender gap in LFPRs. 
Although we will in later chapters concentrate mainly on high-income countries, it  is still 
useful to have a  general idea of the global  trends.  However,  it  should be first  noted that 
statistics on labor force participation are far from perfect. There are at least two reasons for 
this. First, statistics themselves might be unreliable, especially in poorer countries where the 
gathering of labor force data is not necessarily up to Western standards. Second, the concept 
of  market  work  varies  between  countries  and  over  time,  causing  problems  with  both 
longitudinal  and  cross-country  comparisons.  It  has  been  suggested  that  there  might  be 
overemphasis on the narrowing of the gender gap over time as more and more work done by 
women is considered as market work2 (Elson 1999; Tzannatos 1999).
According to data gathered by the World Bank from the year 2007, we can see that there is 
great variation in the gender gap in LFPRs across countries themselves and with respect to 
both geographical regions and income levels (World Bank 2009). For people over the age of 
2 For example, statistics show the number of female farmers increased in Sweden from 751 in 1930 to 58,283 
in 1965, all the while the number of male farmers approximately halved (Tzannatos 1999).
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15,  the  gender  gap  is  positive  in  almost  all  countries,  meaning  that  men's  labor  force 
participation rate is higher than women's. Only Rwanda and Mozambique have negative gaps 
but, as noted earlier, this data might not be totally reliable. Cross-country variation in the 
gender gap is extremely large: The size of the gap ranges from Mozambique's negative gap of 
-10.1 percentage points to Pakistan's positive gap of 64.1 percentage points. As can be seen 
from Table  1,  there  is  also  considerable  variation  across  the  income  levels  of  countries, 
although the variation is not linear. The gender gap is lowest in the high income countries 
with  an  average  of  17.71  percentage  points,  mainly  resulting  from  the  lowest  male 
participation  rate  across  income  groups.  High  levels  of  education  and  relatively  early 
transition from work to pension could be some of the reasons behind this phenomenon. For 
the low income countries, both the male and female labor force participation rates are high, 
also resulting in a relatively low average gap of 18.28 percentage points. Scarce opportunities 
for education and little state support for those outside the labor market could partly explain 
these  high  participation  rates.  Largest  gender  gaps  can  be  found in  the  group of  middle 
income countries, with an average gap of 27.98 percentage points. This group of countries has 
a relatively high male participation rate and a relatively low female participation rate.
Source: World Bank (2009).
We can see from figure 1 that the gender gap has been in decline over time in all of the 
income groups. The narrowing has been strongest in high income countries (HIC) where the 
average gender gap in LFPRs was over 30 percentage points in 1980. However, the gender 
gap has decreased constantly ever since, with the overall decrease from 1980 to 2007 being 
around 13 percentage points. When comparing gender gap in 1980 and 2007 for low income 
countries (LIC), we can see that there has been an overall decrease of around 4 percentage 
points.  There  is  no  clear  trend  for  this  decline:  The gender  gap decreased  in  the  1980s, 
increased in the early 1990s with a peak of 20.82 percentage points in 1996, and has been in 
slow decline  ever  since.  The gender  gap has  also  been slowly narrowing for  the  middle 
income countries  (MIC),  with  a  decline  of  around 5.5 percentage  points  during  the  time 
period in question.
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Table 1: Cross-Country Variation in LFPRs Across Income in 2007
Group Gender Gap (% points) Male LFPR (%) Female LFPR (%)
Low income countries 18.28 82.92 64.64
Middle income countries 27.98 78.58 50.61
High income countries 17.71 69.84 52.13
Source: World Bank (2009).
Geographical variation in gender gap is even larger3, as can be seen from table 2. The lowest 
gaps are in the regions of East Asia and Pacific (13.7 percentage points), Europe and Central 
Asia (17.3 percentage points), and Sub-Saharan Africa (20.2 percentage points). For the first 
and third of these regions, the low gap is the result of high female participation rate, whereas 
for the second it is more due to a low male participation rate. The highest gender gaps are in  
the regions of Middle East and North Africa (47.6 percentage points) and South Asia (46.2 
percentage points). For both of these regions, the large gender gap is mainly due to a low 
female participation rate. The region of Latin America and Caribbean (26.9 percentage points) 
has a gap which is close to the world average, with also average participation rates for both 
genders (World Bank 2009).
Source: World Bank (2009).
When looking at geographical variation over time in figure 2, we can see that the gender gap 
has seen its  biggest decreases in the region of Latin America and Caribbean (LAC). The 
3 It should be noted that this geographical data is only from developing countries, which could skew the results 
especially for the regions of Europe and Central Asia. OECD countries will be discussed in more detail when 
presenting data for the empirical estimation in chapter 6.
6
Figure 1: Cross-Country Variation in Gender Gap in LFPRs Across Countries  
Aggregated by Income 1980-2007
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13.65 80.30 66.65
17.34 67.34 50.00
26.88 79.89 53.01
47.56 73.76 26.20
46.24 82.07 35.83
20.19 79.91 59.71
24.95 77.57 52.63
Group Gender Gap (% points) Male LFPR (%) Female LFPR (%)
East Asia & Pacific
Europe & Central Asia
Latin America & Caribbean
Middle East & North Africa
South Asia
Sub-Saharan Africa
World
Table 2: Geographical Variation in LFPRs in 2007
decrease has been especially intensive since the beginning of the 1990s: The gender gap was 
44.4 percentage points in 1990, but only 26.9 percentage points in 2007. The gender gap has 
also narrowed considerably in the region of Middle East and North Africa (MNA), where the 
decrease has been around 12 percentage points over the time period covered in the figure. For 
the regions with high initial gaps, South Asia (SAS) has seen only meager narrowing. For the 
regions with relatively low gender gaps in 1980, Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and East Asia and 
Pacific (EAP) have seen a slow narrowing of the gap over the time period, whereas the gap 
has remained rather stagnant in Europe and Central Asia (ECA). Overall in the world (WLD), 
the gender gap in LFPRs has decreased from the value of 31.2 percentage points in 1980 to 
24.9 percentage points in 2007.
Source: World Bank (2009).
Besides  variation  across  geography and income groups,  it  is  also beneficial  to  look how 
gender gap in labor force participation differs across age groups. Due to the availability of 
data, this is assessed only on OECD countries. Figure 3  gives us this figure from the late 
1960s to the year 2009. As can be seen from the figure, gender gap in LFPRs is smallest for 
people between the ages of 15 and 24 with a relatively stable figure of 10 percentage points. 
For other age groups, there has been a considerable decrease in the gender gap over the time 
period covered here: Whereas in 1968 the gender gap in these older age groups ranged from 
around 40 percentage points to around 50 percentage points,  nowadays the gender gap is 
around 20 percentage points. When looking at how the gap is constructed with respect to the 
two genders,  we can  divide  the  trends  into  three  groups (see  Appendix  I  for  the  figures 
disaggregated by gender). First,  the stable level of the youngest age groups comes from a 
similar decrease of around 5 percentage points for the two genders. Second, for the age group 
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Figure 2: Geographical Variation in Gender Gap in LFPRs 1980-2007
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of 55-to-64-year-olds, there has been a slight decrease in men's labor force participation and 
an increase in women's participation. For the age groups between these two extremes, the 
overall  decrease  in  the  gender  gap  can  mainly  be  attributed  to  a  significant  increase  in 
women's participation. 
Source: OECD 2010/I.
To conclude, we can state three rough facts about the gender gap in labor force participation 
across countries and time. First,  the gender gap has clearly decreased over time, and this 
decrease is mainly driven by the increase in participation for the women in prime working 
age. In none of the geographical regions or groups of countries considered here has there been 
an increase in the gender gap over the past 30 years. Although some of this decline could be 
attributed to more work done by women becoming official, it seems likely that real progress 
has been made as well. Second, we can see that the levels of gender gap still vary greatly 
across countries. This implies that different policies and institutional structures have different 
effects on the gap. Third and finally, despite the decrease, it is also clear that the gender gap 
persists to some extent in almost all of the countries. We shall keep these trends in mind when 
assessing  the  merits  of  different  theories  seeking to  explain  labor  markets.  To begin  this 
assessment, we will next move on to consider to what extent the difference in labor force 
participation rates between the two genders could be attributed to discrimination.
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Figure 3: Gender Gap in LFPRs across Age Groups 1968-2009
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3 Gender Discrimination in Labor Markets
This chapter will present models and empirical work related to employer discrimination in the 
labor markets. Discrimination takes place when employers make a hiring decision at least 
partly based on the group of the prospective employee, such as being woman or black. Models 
of discrimination can be roughly divided into two different schools. On the one hand, models 
of taste for discrimination describe a situation where an employer dislikes a certain group and 
refuses to hire them or alternatively pays them lower wages. Crucially, employers are here 
willing to pay for the possibility to discriminate. On the other hand, in models of statistical 
discrimination employers utilize group proxies to assess unknown worker qualities in order to 
maximize profits. Besides differences in employer preferences, the two groups of models also 
differ so that the former assumes perfect information in the hiring process whereas the latter 
assumes  imperfect  information.  We  will  first  go  through  some  models  of  taste  for 
discrimination,  with a  specific  focus  on the work conducted  by Arrow (1971) and Black 
(1995). Afterwards, we will move to models of statistical discrimination where Coate and 
Loury's (1993) work will be looked into with greatest detail. Assessment of the rather meager 
amount of empirical work concerning gender discrimination will follow the presentation of 
the theoretical models. Results from the empirical work imply that discrimination might still  
be present in the labor markets.
3.1 Taste for Discrimination
Although discrimination in the labor markets is nowadays largely illegal, it can still exist in 
the labor markets. The discrimination conducted by employers can roughly be divided to two 
parts:  Hiring  decisions  and  decisions  concerning  employees  within  the  firm.  First,  the 
employer  can discriminate  while hiring for new workforce by either choosing not  to hire 
people from a certain group or, alternatively, they can give them lower wages when the hiring 
decision  has  been done.  Even if  such discrimination  was illegal,  its  prevention  might  be 
difficult. As the hiring decisions are often somewhat ambiguous, it might be hard to explicitly 
show that a person from a given group would clearly have been more competent than the one 
who got the job due to discrimination. According to Krug (1997), there are also numerous 
possibilities for discrimination within the firm which are mainly caused by the nature of the 
work  contracts  as  relatively  open  concerning  the  exact  job  description.  For  example, 
employers can move employees from one position to another, allowing them to give unwanted 
tasks  to  people  or  groups  they dislike.  Discrimination  can  also  take  place  when  making 
decisions for promotions or wage increases. When discrimination takes place within a firm, it 
9
can continue over a long period of time, as arguably employees face higher transaction costs 
than employers in securing a new work contract4. This could slow the outflow of people from 
firms  with discriminating practices. As opposed to discrimination in hiring, discrimination 
within a firm is less likely to affect participation figures considerably.
Gary Becker was one of the first economists to theorize how discrimination could work in the 
labor markets. An individual is seen to have a “taste for discrimination”, if they act as if they 
were  willing  to  pay something,  either  directly  or  in  the  form of  reduced  income,  to  be 
associated with some persons instead of others (Becker 1957, 6). This may take place either 
because  of  a  prejudice  against  a  group,  or  because  of  wrong  estimates  concerning  the 
productivity of the said group. A way to measure the strength of the taste for discrimination is 
to introduce a discrimination coefficient. For example, a discriminating employer facing a 
money wage rate of π will act as if they were facing a net wage rate of π(1+d i), where di is the 
discrimination coefficient and is larger than zero. If the coefficient were smaller than zero, we 
could talk about nepotism, where one group is favored over the others. Besides measuring 
employer discrimination, discrimination coefficient can also easily be used in the cases of 
employee  or  consumer  discrimination  (Becker  1957).  However,  I  will  subsequently 
concentrate on the case of employer discrimination.
A simple model of employer discrimination based on taste is given by Arrow (1971). First, let 
us assume a large number of homogeneous firms. There are two groups of workers: B, who 
are valued negatively and W, who are valued positively despite the fact that the groups are 
equally productive  and therefore  perfect  substitutes  in  production.  Full  employment  is  in 
place,  and  discrimination  is  reflected  in  the  wage  differences.  When  an  employer 
discriminates, they are maximizing a utility function U(π, B, W) instead of maximizing just 
their profits π. There is only one type of labor, and capital is taken as given. Therefore, the 
choice of labor is the only one affecting profits and thus the profit function is:
=f WB−wW W−wB B  (3.1)
where wW and wB are the wage rates, taken as given by the employers. The employer equates 
marginal productivities of the labor of different groups to price them. However, the marginal 
productivity of B includes the discrimination coefficient so that:
MPB=wBdB , d b0  (3.2)
4 Krug (1997) suggests that employees' higher sunk costs are due to high requirements of firm-specific know-
how in the labor markets. However, employers also face the costs of searching, hiring and training a new 
employee which should decrease their ability to sustain high worker turnover.
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Similarly, the marginal productivity for group W is:
MPW=wWdW , d W0  (3.3)
As  the  two  types  of  labor  are  interchangeable,  i.e.,  the  productivities  of  employees  are 
constant regardless of their group, the employer will choose employees so that the marginal 
productivities of both groups are equal. Thus we receive the equation:
wW−wB=dB−d W0  (3.4)
As the discrimination coefficient for group B is larger than the one for group W, this implies  
higher  wages  for  group  W.  If  we  further  assume  completely  homogeneous  firms  in  the 
markets,  meaning  that  every  firm  has  the  same  taste  for  discrimination,  the  effect  of 
discrimination is purely distributive from B to W. Change in firms profits when compared to a 
system with no discrimination will be:
−0=f L−MPLLdW Wd B B−f L−MPLL=dW Wd B B   (3.5)
If we assume that the employers' discriminatory satisfaction depends only on the ratio of B to 
W workers, dwW+dBB will equal zero and there are no profit losses for the firm; there will 
only be a transfer of wages from the group B to the group W (Arrow 1971). As lower wages 
reduce the incentive to enter labor markets, discrimination is likely to lower the participation 
rate of group B.
To change the analysis, let us now assume disparate utility functions to the firms, meaning 
that  some employers  have  a  stronger  taste  for  discrimination  than  others.  Now,  the  firm 
chooses the composition of its workforce so that it must satisfy equation 3.4 and the fact that  
dwW+dBB will equal zero. This gives us:
W
L
=
dB
wW−wB
; B
L
=
−d W
wW−wB 
 (3.6)
As dB > 0, this would imply that firms with more taste for discrimination would have a larger  
proportion of workers belonging to the group W, while still holding that the group W gets 
higher wages. However, assuming diminishing marginal productivity for labor, this would put 
discriminating firms at a disadvantage in competitive markets as the marginal productivities 
of the two groups are the same. Therefore, the discriminating firms would become extinct in 
the long run, assuming that there would be some firms who do not discriminate (Arrow 1971). 
Thus, there would be no effect on the participation in the long run. 
The model of taste for discrimination is to some extent consistent with what has actually taken 
place with respect to the gender gap in labor force participation: The narrowing of the gender 
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gap in labor force participation could be interpreted as being a proof of a change in employer 
preferences which would be represented in changes in the discrimination coefficient.  This 
would  be  driven  by competitive  pressure  where  discriminating  firms  are  pushed  off  the 
markets by the profit maximizing firms. Following this theory, the gender gap should in the 
long run be related to the level of competition in the corresponding markets as competition 
drives discriminating firms off the markets.  However, the actual cross-country variation in 
the gender gaps can be seen as undermining this simple model of taste for discrimination. As 
the economies of the countries within the European Union, for example, should be rather well 
integrated with one another, we should be able to see relatively similar levels of competition 
in all of these countries. This would result in similar levels of discrimination, and therefore 
similar levels for the gender  gap in  LFPRs (assuming discrimination were the only thing 
affecting LFPRs). As clear differences remain in the gender gaps within the European Union, 
we can see that  such a simple model  of  taste  for  discrimination is  unable to  explain the 
majority of differences. Finally, Arrow's model of taste for discrimination is unable to explain 
the persistence of discrimination in the labor markets: If we assume markets to work perfectly, 
the existence of just one discriminating firm should drive the markets to a non-discriminating 
equilibrium.
As noted above, competition should drive discriminating firms off the markets. However, as 
perfect  competition  rarely exists  in  the  real  world,  it  should  be  useful  to  look into  how 
discrimination would work in a system where some parties have more bargaining power than 
others in the labor markets. Black (1995) has formulated a model for taste for discrimination 
in labor markets where firms have monopsonistic power coming from the fact that workers 
face higher transaction costs than firms in the labor markets. Black shows that the existence of 
prejudiced  firms  in  such markets  can  result  in  a  situation  where  the  discriminated  group 
receives lower wages even from the unprejudiced employers. 
More formally, let us assume that there are (1-γ) workers who belong to a group A and who do 
not face discrimination. Consequently, there are  γ workers belonging to group B who face 
discrimination. All the workers have the same marginal productivity V. A worker may either 
stay out of the labor market and receive utility Uh from household production, or they can 
look for  a  job.  The workers know that  there are  two types  of firms in  the labor  market: 
prejudiced  firms  (p)  hire  workers  only  from group  A and  pay  a  wage  of  wap,  whereas 
unprejudiced firms (u) hire both workers and pays wages of wau and wbu for groups A and B 
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respectively. Prejudiced firms constitute a fraction θ of the markets and unprejudiced firms a 
fraction (1-θ). Besides wages, workers draw utility from job satisfaction α, which is a match-
specific random variable with a distribution function F(α), and a probability density function 
f(α). As the distribution function is assumed to be strictly log concave, the inverse hazard 
function m(α) = [1-F(α)]/f(α) is strictly decreasing (Black 1995).
A worker from group A accepts a work offer when the wages and the utility derived from 
work exceed their reservation utility uar so that α ≥  uar -waj (j = u,p). With κ being the cost of a 
search and using standard dynamic programming approach, the value of the search (Ua) can 
be written as:
Ua=
∫
p
a
∞
wp
af d1−∫
u
a
∞
w u
a f d −
1−F p
a −1−Fu
a 
 (3.7)
As the worker is indifferent with continuing the search and accepting a job at the reservation 
utility level (uar = Ua), we can rewrite the equation as:
=∫
up
a
∞
wp
a−ur
af d1−∫
u u
a
∞
w u
a−ur
a f d   (3.8)
Now, the LHS of the equation 3.8 represents the cost of additional search, whereas the RHS 
represents the potential gains from continued search. Furthermore, we can see the reservation 
utility of type A workers increases if there is an increase in the wages offered by either type of 
employers, or if the number of prejudiced employers increases. For the type B workers the 
corresponding equations are:
Ub=
1−∫
ab
∞
w u
bf d −
1−1−Fb
 (3.9), and
/1−=∫
ab
∞
wu
b−ur
bf d   (3.10)
In  the  equation  3.10,  the  LHS  represents  the  cost  for  a  type  B  worker  of  finding  an 
unprejudiced firm and RHS the expected gain of finding such an employer. Therefore, an 
increase in the number of prejudiced firms increases the search costs, and therefore lowers the 
reservation utility for type B workers. In addition, the lowering of reservation utility allows 
the unprejudiced firms to lower their wage offers for type B workers (Black 1995).
For the employer's  problem, let  there be M potential  employers,  of who  ρ refuse to  hire 
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minority workers whereas (1-ρ) do not have a problem with this. In equilibrium ρ may or may 
not be equal to θ, the total number of prejudiced employers. If τ represents the entrepreneurial 
ability, the fixed costs of operating a firm are defined as a decreasing function Φ(τ). Let G(Φ) 
be the distribution function of fixed costs and g(Φ) the density function. Furthermore, assume 
that the distribution of fixed costs is identical across prejudiced and unprejudiced firms. Now, 
differences in fixed costs will determine the number and composition of firms operating in the 
market. With a critical value of Φ=Φi (i=u,p), the firm earns zero profits. Then the zero-profit 
function for a prejudiced firm will be:
 pp=M G p1−G u
−1 N 1−vaa−p=0  (3.11)
And for the unprejudiced firm:
 u u=MG p1−G u
−1 N  vbb1−vaa−u=0  (3.12)
The zero-profit functions determine the number of prejudiced firms (θ) on the market so that:
=
Gp
G p1−G u 
 (3.13)
The two profit functions indicate that the fixed costs of unprejudiced firms are lower than 
those of prejudiced firms (Φu>Φp), and therefore the actual number of discriminating firms is 
lower  in  the  markets  than  their  potential  number  (θ<ρ).  This  means that  the  competitive 
pressure inducted by the unprejudiced firms limits the number of prejudiced firms that can 
survive. However, some prejudiced firms from the high end of ability distribution will remain, 
as their high abilities compensate for the losses occurring from discrimination. A prejudiced 
firm will earn lower profits than an unprejudiced firm when they have similar abilities (Black 
1995).
Black (1995) draws three more conclusions from the model. First, it should be noted that an 
increase in the reservation utility of the type B worker will increase the number of prejudiced 
firms on the market as the wage costs  of the unprejudiced firms increase.  Second,  if  the 
fraction  of  potential  prejudiced  employers  increases,  the  actual  number  of  prejudiced 
employers  also  increases  and  the  reservation  utility  for  minority  workers  decreases  as  it 
becomes harder for them to find work. This also leads to a decrease in their wages and thus 
employment.  Third  and  finally,  an  increase  in  the  fraction  of  workers  belonging  to  the 
discriminated minority results in an increase in the profits of the unprejudiced firms and a fall 
of profits for the prejudiced firms, further leading to an increase in wages and reservation 
utility for the minority.
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Black's discrimination has some clear advantages when compared to Arrow's model of taste 
for discrimination.  Whereas Arrow's model predicted that  unprejudiced firms would drive 
prejudiced firms out of the markets, Black's model shows how some prejudiced firms with 
higher abilities could remain in the markets despite the competitive pressures. Therefore, the 
latter model can explain the persistence of the gender gap in LFPRs. Black's model can also 
explain  the  decline  in  the  gender  gap in  LFPRs over  time with two contributing  factors, 
whereas Arrow's model attributed this only to competition. First, an increase in the number of 
people in the group that is discriminated against drives down profits for the discriminating 
firms,  allowing  unprejudiced  firms  to  prosper.  An  exogenous  increase  in  the  number  of 
women willing to work in the labor markets, caused by for example improvements in home 
appliances, would thus result in an increase in wages, tempting more and more women to 
enter the labor markets. Second, as the number of potential prejudiced firms has an impact on 
the outcomes of the model, increasing tolerance among employers towards female employees 
helps to drive up female labor force participation. Finally, Black's model can also to some 
extent  explain  the  cross-country  variation  by  differences  in  the  reservation  utilities  for 
women. In some countries the reservation utility would be high, resulting in low female labor 
force  participation.  This  leaves  just  the  variation  in  reservation  utilities  to  be  explained. 
Overall, Black's model is thus consistent with the observed trends in the gender gap in LFPRs.
3.2 Statistical Discrimination
Statistical  discrimination takes  place when employers prefer  to  hire  people with a certain 
visible  characteristic  for  economic  reasons  instead  of  a  “pure”  taste  for  discrimination. 
Whereas  taste  for  discrimination  caused  a  decline  in  employer  profits,  statistical 
discrimination is used in order to maximize profits. There are three main assumptions which 
are  common  for  models  of  statistical  discrimination.  First,  employers  must  be  able  to 
distinguish the groups in question easily, since otherwise the costs of using a group proxy to 
discriminate would be larger than its monetary benefits. For example, gender or race could be 
relatively easily used as such proxies. Second, there must be a sufficiently high cost for the 
employer  in  getting  to  know an  individual  worker's  productivity  to  make  discrimination 
profitable, as otherwise they would just use employee evaluation in their hiring decisions. 
Finally, the employer must have some idea of the distribution of productivity within each 
group used as a proxy. This perception of the distribution could come from employer's prior 
statistical experience of hiring from different groups, or from a sociological belief that some 
groups  grow  up  disadvantaged  due  to  prejudice  in  the  society  and  are  therefore  less 
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productive (Arrow 1971; Phelps 1972).
Phelps (1972) presents a simple model for of statistical discrimination5 where employers can 
use a test to measure the quality of each applicant when making a hiring decision. After a test  
has been conducted, employers then assess the reliability of the results based on their prior 
experience with different groups. According to the model, there are three different factors the 
employers can consider when assessing the test scores between people from different groups: 
distribution of skills, perceived difference in mean ability, and the difference in the reliability 
of the test  for different  groups.  On the first  account,  the employers  may believe that  the 
distribution of skills between the groups is different, even though the mean values of the skills 
are the same. It makes no difference to the model whether this is actually true or not. Let us 
assume that the employers were to believe that men have a larger variance in skills. Assuming 
a man and a woman scored equally well in a test, the hiring decision would now depend on 
the level of the test score. If the score was relatively high, the employer would hire the male 
applicant as the result of the female applicant's test score would not seem credible due to the 
narrow distribution of women's skills in general. However, if the test scores were sufficiently 
low, the employer would prefer the female applicant for the same reason: her low test score 
would seem more unlikely. The logic is similar in the case where the employer believes that 
the test is more reliable in the case of one group: If the scores from the test were high, hire 
from the group for which the test is more reliable. If the test scores were low, hire from the 
other group6. The possible perceived difference in mean ability works similarly to the idea of 
taste for discrimination presented before, as there is no mechanism to correct for this false 
perception. All in all, there would be no consistent discrimination against any single group. 
Instead, some people in both groups would better off, and some would be worse off due to 
statistical discrimination.
Aigner and Cain (1977) criticize the view that differences in variance in abilities in Phelps' 
model  would  even constitute  as  an  actual  case  of  discrimination.  Whereas  Phelps  thinks 
discrimination  means  different  pay  for  different  test  scores,  Aigner  and  Cain  define 
discrimination as different pay for different abilities. According to the authors, if both groups 
are paid in accordance with their expected productivities based on an unbiased predictor, and 
5 For an alternative early model of statistical discrimination, see Arrow (1971).
6 The difference in the reliability of test scores seems somewhat trivial in practice: As the problem would 
already acknowledged by the employers, development of a non-biased test should not be an overwhelming 
problem.
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if both groups receive same mean wages (assuming equal abilities), the practice described 
above cannot constitute discrimination7. According to the authors, an exception for this could 
be  a  case,  where  employers  focus  their  hiring  on  the  top  range  of  the  test  scores. 
Consequently, it would not really matter whether one has mediocre or low test score as only 
people with high scores would be hired. If men were to be seen as having a higher variance in  
skills, they would be hired for jobs requiring high test scores. The advantage held by women 
in the lower range of scores would then be offset by the fact that no one with a low score gets 
hired.  This  requires  a  reserve  of  unemployed  people,  as  otherwise  top  employees  would 
gradually be picked for employment until everyone would be employed. As full employment 
is non-existent in the real world, this is a fair point to make.
The  main  limitation  in  Phelps's  formulation  even  with  the  extension  of  a  reserve  of 
unemployed people is that it  does not allow potential  employers to gain new information 
about the applicants and adjust their hiring practices accordingly. As there is a clear incentive 
to develop techniques for applicant assessment, it seems unlikely that group proxies would 
have to be used extensively in the long run. Thus, the model is not well suited to explain 
discrimination and consequently differences in participation. This problem is partly solved by 
Spence (1973) who has applied a signaling model into the labor markets. Under imperfect 
information,  employers  hire  people  based  on  visible  attributes  as  their  individual 
productivities cannot be known. Spence divides visible attributes into two forms: Unalterable 
attributes, which he calls indices, and alterable attributes, which he calls signals. The model 
works as a loop in which applicants make signaling decisions under signaling costs, which in 
turn  affects  employers'  hiring  decisions  (see  figure  4).  As  employers  then  observe  the 
relationship  between  attributes  and  marginal  productivity,  they  adjust  their  conditional 
probabilistic  beliefs  on  the  relationship.  This  causes  changes  in  the  wage  structure  as  a 
function of signaling and indices which then affects the signaling decisions of the applicants.
Let us now assume two groups of people, for example men and women. Within each group 
the distribution of productive capabilities and the signaling costs are the same. Therefore, 
gender and productivity are uncorrelated in the population. The crucial idea of the model is 
that  the  opportunity  sets  of  men  and  women  with  comparable  productivities  are  not 
necessarily the same. If employers' distribution settings are conditional on gender (as well as 
7 Personally, I would side with Phelps on this issue and define that discrimination takes place if one's 
belonging to a certain group unrelated to the work in question affects hiring decision in any way.
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on education),  different  genders  could  face  different  signaling  incentives.  Therefore  their 
signaling  decisions  are  made  independently  of  each  other,  possibly  resulting  in  a  stable 
equilibrium  in  which  different  groups  have  different  levels  of  education,  wages  and/or 
employment,  and  the  differences  persist  indefinitely  (Spence  1973).  As  women  have 
historically invested less in education for various reasons, such as lack of opportunities in the 
labor markets due to taste for discrimination, Spence's model shows how the inequality can 
persist even though preferences for taste for discrimination have already disappeared.
Source: Spence 1973, 359.
Coate and Loury (1993) have constructed a more complex model of self-fulfilling negative 
stereotypes.  In  line  with  Spence,  their  model  shows how differences  in  expected  payoffs 
between groups can lead to a stable equilibrium in which the relevant position of the groups 
are different, even though their initial abilities are exactly the same. The main advantage of 
the model is in formally showing how employer expectations can create different equilibria in 
educational  and  work patterns  for  different  groups.  Furthermore,  Coate  and  Loury allow 
employers to hire from both groups despite the differences in education and productivities. 
Finally, this model allows the existence of different tasks in the labor markets.
The basic  components  of  the model  are  as  follows.  There is  a  large number  of  identical 
employers and a large population of workers. Each employer is randomly matched with many 
workers. Workers belong to one of the two differing groups, B or W. λ is the fraction of W's in 
the population. Employers assign workers into one of the two possible tasks, “zero” or “one”. 
Task one is both more demanding and more rewarding. All the workers can perform task zero 
in a satisfactory manner, whereas task one requires more skills. As firing is not possible, every 
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Figure 4: Signaling and Hiring Feedback in the Job Market
worker would naturally like to be assigned to task one irrespective of whether they have the 
required qualifications or not. A worker assigned to task one will receive a gross benefit of ω 
compared to being assigned to task zero. An employer will gain a net return of xq > 0 if they 
assign a qualified person to task one and -xu < 0 if they assign an unqualified worker. Ratio of 
the net gain to loss is defined by r ≡ (xq / xu). Workers' and employers' net returns for task zero 
are normalized to zero (Coate & Loury 1993).
Employers are unable to observe whether a person is qualified prior to assigning them to task 
one. Instead, employers observe each worker's group identity and a noisy signal θ which takes 
values between zero and one. The distribution of θ depends on whether a worker is qualified 
in a similar manner for both groups. Let Fq(θ) [Fu(θ)] be the probability that signal does not 
exceed  θ, stating that the worker is qualified [unqualified]. Then let fq(θ) and fu(θ) be the 
related density functions. Define  φ(θ) ≡ fq(θ)/fu(θ) for all  θ. Also assume that  φ(θ) is non-
increasing on [0,1], implying that higher values of the signal are more probable if the worker 
is qualified. Employers' assignment problem is in choosing a threshold value for θ in order to 
maximize their profits. Workers' problem is in choosing whether or not to make an investment 
in acquiring qualifications for task one (Coate & Loury 1993).
Now assume a worker belonging to a group whose representative member has, according to 
an employer's prior belief, a probability of π for being qualified. If the worker emits the signal 
θ, then the employer's posterior probability that they will be qualified is the number  ξ(π,θ) 
given by:
 ,=
 f q
 f q1−f u
= 1
11−/  (3.14)
Employer's expected payoff from assigning a worker to task one is therefore:
 ,xq−1− ,xu  (3.15)
As the return from task zero was set to zero, employer's best policy is to assign a worker to 
task one if and only if the ratio of the net gain is such that:
r≥1−

  (3.16)
The employer does best to choose a threshold value for the signal s so that:
s  ≡min ∈[0,1]r1−

  (3.17)
Thus, a prior belief on the probability of being qualified (π) for a group has an impact on the 
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level  of  the  signal  required  for  assigning  worker  from that  group  to  task  one.  A more 
optimistic belief, signified by a high value of π, will decrease the threshold value of hiring and 
vice versa (Coate & Loury 1993).
Workers  investment  decision  consists  of  two  components:  the  gross  return  from  being 
assigned to  task  one (ω) and the increased  probability of  assignment  due to  investing  in 
education. The latter depends on the standards they expect to face. Let β ≡ ω[Fu(s)-Fq(s)] be 
the expected benefit for investment for worker facing the threshold value of hiring s. Let also 
there be an investment cost c for education. The worker invests if and only if the costs are 
smaller than the expected benefits [c≤β(s)] and thus for all workers facing standard s, the 
proportion that becomes qualified is G(β(s)). The expected benefit function is single-peaked 
and increasing [decreasing] whenever  φ(s)>1 [φ(s)<1] and satisfying  β(0)=β(1)=0. Provided 
that G has a positive density over the relevant range and that G(0)=0, also G(β(s)) is single-
peaked  and rising  [falling]  with  s  as  φ(s)>1 [φ(s)<1],  with  G(β(0))=G(β(1))=0 (Coate  & 
Loury 1993).
Employers'  beliefs will become self-confirming if those beliefs induce workers to become 
qualified at exactly the rate postulated by the prior beliefs. Equilibrium can thus be defined as:
 i=G  s  i; i=b, w  (3.18)
Figure 5: Equilibrium with Negative Stereotypes Against B's
Source: Coate & Loury 1993, 1225.
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A discriminatory  equilibrium  can  take  place  whenever  the  above  equation  has  multiple 
solutions.  Coate  and  Loury  show  that  under  certain  conditions8 there  can  be  multiple 
equilibria which may or may not be locally stable. Figure 5 illustrates the model graphically. 
The horizontal axis depicts assignment standards and the vertical axis measures beliefs. The 
EE curve  shows the  standard-belief  pairs  that  are  consistent  with  employer  optimization, 
whereas the WW curve represents pairs of standards and proportions of a group investing 
consistent with optimal worker behavior (Coate & Loury 1993). In this system of multiple 
equilibria, the employers are skeptical as to group B's suitability to perform task one (low 
value for  π), which results in higher hiring standards (a high value of s). At the same time, 
group W faces much lower hiring standards. Thus, groups end up in different positions in the 
labor markets despite being initially equally gifted.
The main advantage of Coate and Loury's model over the other models presented above is 
that it can be used to explain the persistence of different labor force participation rates for the 
two genders in the long run. Because the equilibria can be stable in the competitive markets 
with profit maximizing firms, there is no apparent mechanism that would automatically get 
rid of the gender gap in LFPRs. In addition, the model is consistent with different levels of the 
gender  gap  in  different  countries,  as  the  functions  defining  the  labor  force  equilibria  for 
different groups can vary across economies. Finally, the model can explain the decrease in the 
gender  gap  in  movement  towards  a  new  equilibrium which  might  have  been  caused  by 
exogenous increases in women's education. Such an exogenous change is possible if people 
view education as having other advantages besides accumulation of human capital.
Coate  and  Loury  (1993)  suggest  two  main  ways  of  moving  away  from  discriminating 
equilibrium. First, one can subsidize employers to hire more people from the disadvantaged 
group.  However,  this  is  potentially  counterproductive  as  it  can  under  certain  conditions 
increase the actual differences in productivities by changing the ways the two groups invest in 
their abilities. Thus, subsidies are unlikely to get rid of the problem in the long term. A better 
option  would  be  to  subsidize  the  skill  acquisition  of  the  disadvantaged  group  which, 
according  to  the  authors,  lacks  the  potential  problems  of  hiring  subsidies.  Therefore, 
investment in women's education would be the best way to close down the gender gap in labor 
force participation rates.
8 1) φ(θ) must be continuous, strictly decreasing, and strictly positive on [0,1] 
2)G(c) is continuous and satisfies G(0) = 0
3) There is an s within (0,1), for which G(β(s) > φ(s)/(r+φ(s))
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3.3 Empirical Studies in Gender Discrimination
Detecting  discrimination  empirically  can  be  rather  difficult,  as  people  are  unlikely  to 
voluntarily affirm discriminating practices. Even though the gaps in labor market performance 
between the  two genders  are  consistent  with the  presence  of  discrimination,  they do not 
provide  clear  support  for  its  presence  by  themselves.  One  way  to  assess  the  impact  of 
discrimination would be to use a set of independent variables in regression analysis to explain 
a  gap  in  labor  market  outcomes,  and  treat  the  unexplained  gap as  showing  the  level  of 
discrimination.  However,  Altonji  and Blank (1999) give two ways in which the estimates 
obtained this way could be biased. First, if discrimination affects, besides market behavior, the 
pre-market  choices  of  education,  it  is  possible  that  the  unexplained  gap  understates 
discrimination.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  also  possible  that  regressive  models  omit  some 
relevant variables, making them overstate the impact of discrimination. The authors go on to 
present certain empirical approaches which can overcome this problem9. One approach is to 
send résumés that are identical except for the race, gender or the ethnicity of the applicant to 
potential employers, and see whether an equal proportion of people are invited to the follow-
up  interview.  A more  sophisticated  approach  of  this  kind  is  to  first  send  résumés,  and 
afterwards actually send auditors to company interviews. The auditors  would be paired up 
across gender or racial lines so that the two people in one pair have similar characteristics and 
résumés. One could then compare the results of getting an interview or getting the job across 
group lines and across pairs. However, the problem with this method is that it is difficult to 
find  auditors  whose  characteristics  and  resumes  match  well  enough  in  relevant  factors 
required for the job. Furthermore, taking up firms' time without asking them to participate in 
research could be seen as unethical. Finally, this method requires lots of work, resulting in 
relatively small samples.
Despite the potential problems of the résumé-method, there have been some attempts to use it  
in practice. Neumark, Bank and Van Nort (1996) have used the audit method in studying the 
occupational discrimination between waiters and waitresses in the US. The low number of 
auditors and their lack of training, however, invoke some questions over the validity of this 
piece of research. As empirical research on the topic is scarce, however, the results should be 
worth looking into. As a result of the auditing process, the authors concluded that women’s 
probability of getting an interview or a job offer was 46% lower than that of men for high-
9 For an extensive review on the methods and results of field experiments in assessing racial or sexual 
discrimination in the labor, housing and product markets, see Riach & Rich (2002). We will concentrate here 
on sexual discrimination in the labor markets.
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priced  restaurants,  and  the  results  were  statistically  significant.  In  contrast,  women  were 
slightly more likely to receive an interview or a job offer in the low-priced restaurants. These 
results are consistent with the model of statistical discrimination where employers think that 
men have a higher variance in their skill levels although the mean of skills were the same for 
both genders. Another possible explanation for the results would be that discrimination would 
be related to customer tastes differing across the quality of the restaurant. In a similar manner, 
Riach  and Rich  (1987)  sent  applications  to  various  firms  operating  in  different  fields  in 
Australia and compared whether men and women were equally likely to be invited to an 
interview  in  a  given  occupation.  The  authors  found  some  evidence  that  women  were 
discriminated against in both physical (approximately 24% of cases compared with 6% for 
men)  and  high-paying  occupations  (17%  of  cases  compared  with  8%  for  men).  No 
discrimination against men was found in low-paying occupations, implying that the lowly 
skilled part of the group with small variance of skills is unable to exert gains from statistical 
discrimination due to the reserve of unemployed people willing to work.
Goldin and Rouse (2000) have  studied the  presence  of  discrimination  with the  help of  a 
“natural”  experiment  by looking at  the  gendered  hiring  patterns  for  symphony orchestras 
before and after the institution of “blind” auditions.  In a “blind” audition,  the identity of 
prospective employee is hidden from the selectors so that the latter do not know the gender of 
the former. Therefore, discrimination by a visible attribute becomes impossible. The authors 
found that women were more likely to advance in the selection process when blind auditions 
were applied. Overall, it is estimated that blind auditions increased the likelihood for women 
to be hired by 25 percent, and also that they can explain around 30 percent of the increase in 
the proportion of females among the new players. Although this implies strong discrimination 
in the labor markets,  we should be cautious in drawing general conclusions as symphony 
orchestras are probably not representative of the labor markets as a whole.
The three pieces of research presented above give us some proof that discrimination against 
women can still exist in hiring decisions. However, it remains unclear whether this is based on 
malevolent taste for discrimination, or on statistical discrimination where employers try to 
maximize their profits. In order to solve this problem, Petersen, Saporta and Seidel (2005) 
have compared the hiring decisions with work ratings. As this was done in a single firm, 
generalizations should again be avoided. The authors found out that there is no difference in 
the  proportion  of  different  genders  being  hired  from the  pool  of  applicants  even  though 
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women tended  to  do  slightly  better  than  men  in  working  performance  ratings.  Thus,  no 
evidence of taste for discrimination or statistical discrimination was found. Another way to 
confirm the existence of discrimination is to compare wages to productivity at the aggregate 
level. Hellerstein, Neumark and Troske (2002) do this by using firm- and plant-level data to 
study relationships between profitability, growth, ownership changes, product market power 
and the sex composition of the firm’s workforce. The results indicate that the percentage of 
women in a firm’s workforce is positively related to profitability among firms with market 
power. This supports the idea that there is discrimination, and that the discrimination has an 
adverse effect on firm’s ability to compete: Only firms with market power can sustain the 
losses from discrimination10. However, the authors find no relationship between firm growth 
or ownership change and the percentage of women in the workforce. Therefore, there is no 
direct  evidence  that  discriminating  firms  would  be  driven  off  the  market  at  least  in  the 
relatively short five year period from which data was available. 
In  this  chapter  we  have  presented  model  of  both  taste  for  discrimination  and  statistical 
discrimination.  The concept of taste for discrimination was shown to be problematic in a 
system of perfect competition, as discriminating firms would be driven off the markets. In 
order to accommodate this, we must assume some extensions to the model such as different 
abilities among employers.  Discrimination was,  however,  shown to be a viable concept if 
there are frictions in the labor markets. We showed how imperfect information may cause 
employers to use easily visible proxies when making hiring decisions which could lead to 
discrimination  against  certain  groups.  Furthermore,  it  was  shown  how  initial  images  of 
worker productivities can be perpetuated in a feedback of educational investment, signaling 
and hiring.  In  our  discussion  of  the  empirical  literature,  we found some proof  as  to  the 
existence of sexual discrimination in at least some parts of the labor markets. The low number 
of research, however, prevents us from making far reaching conclusions from these results. 
The  relative  importance  of  discrimination  in  determining  differences  in  the  labor  force 
participation rates between men and women remains therefore unclear. 
4 Wages, Human Capital and Household Economics
The previous  chapter  on discrimination  touched on the  idea that  employee  investment  in 
education  affects  labor  market  participation.  Among  others,  this  notion  of  human  capital 
impacting  labor  supply will  be developed further  here  as  this  chapter  focuses  on models 
10 However, Altonji and Blank (1999) note that worker composition including the percentage of female workers 
could be correlated with heterogeneity in production technology, and therefore endogenous to the model.
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concerning labor supply. We are interested in how different factors can have a different impact 
on  male  and  female  labor  supply,  thus  contributing  to  the  gender  gap  in  labor  force 
participation. A number of different models are relevant here. We will begin by going through 
the general model of labor supply where supply decisions are made based on wages and other 
available  sources  of  income.  The gender  gap in  participation  could  thus  be explained by 
differences  in  wage and non-labor  income levels  between women and men.  This  will  be 
followed by a short presentation of human capital models which seek to explain gender gaps 
in labor markets by differences in skill levels and in types of skills the two genders have. 
Because  women  often  spend  some time  outside  the  labor  force  due  to  childbearing  and 
-rearing, they face a higher risk of skill depreciation which could impact their future work 
opportunities as well as earnings. Afterwards, we will present two types of household models 
which could help us to understand why especially married women are less likely than their 
husbands to participate in the labor markets. In models of altruistic households, household 
members  maximize  their  collective  utility.  In  contrast,  household  members  are  seen  to 
maximize their individual utilities in household bargaining models. Of the two, household 
bargaining models will be shown to be more relevant in assessing contemporary differences in 
LFPRs. Related to household models, we will finish this chapter by considering how fertility 
decisions impact labor supply.
4.1 Wages, Non-Labor Income and Labor Supply
The hours, days and years a person chooses to work over a specific time period constitutes 
one's labor supply. People are assumed to choose their labor supply by considering their real 
wages per unit of time in relation to the value of their time which could be used in other 
activities such as leisure, household labor, or education. Labor is supplied in order to gain 
access  to  wage  income  which  can  subsequently  be  used  to  buy  commodities.  However, 
available assets and access to non-labor income also affect supply decisions by making people 
less dependent on wage labor. Figure 6 shows this participation decision. If a person is not 
working, they have T hours of leisure. We can see that they are then at the endowment point E 
with a utility of U0. With a low wage offer (wlow), working does not pay off as the worker 
would end up at the endowment point X with a lower utility UG. If the offered wage rate was 
high enough (whigh), working would be beneficial as the worker would gain enough utility 
from additional consumption to offset the loss of leisure. The worker would then be at the 
endowment point Y, with the utility of UH.  The reservation wage w gives the minimum 
increase in income which would prompt the worker to move from endowment point E to 
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working the first hour. Following this definition, it is clear that a higher wage will always 
increase the probability of participation11. The reservation wage depends on the person's tastes 
which determine the slope of the indifference curve. If we assume that leisure is a normal 
good,  it  is  clear  that  an  increase  in  non-labor  income  will  result  in  an  increase  in  the 
reservation wage as workers want to consume more leisure (Borjas 2010). Thus, changes and 
variation in the gender gap in LFPRs would be caused by differences in wages and access to 
non-labor income between the two genders. The observed decrease in the gap in participation 
would thus most likely be related to decrease in the gap in wages.
Source: Borjas 2010, 41.
Although most of the research on the effect of wages on labor supply is concerned with the 
amount  of  working  hours,  there  have  also  been  some  papers  dealing  explicitly  with 
participation. For example Macunovich (1996) has found that both male relative income and 
female average wages affect participation in the United States: Large differences in income 
levels  between  the  two  genders  with  men  having  higher  wages  will  decrease  female 
participation, implying that male wages should partly be considered as non-labor income for 
women. High average wages for women will logically increase their participation, as wage 
labor becomes more desirable. Similar results concerning the gender wage gap in the US have 
11 The case might be different for labor supply in general. If the worker already worked some hours, higher 
hourly wage could increase the income of the worker so much that they would decrease their labor supply.
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Figure 6: Reservation Wage
also been found by Attanasio, Low and Sánchez-Marcos (2008). A cross-country comparison 
done by Mincer (1985) also confirms this trend. This study, covering thirteen industrialized 
countries  from 1960  to  1980,  gives  an  average  participation  wage  elasticity  of  1.02  for 
women.  The  elasticity  varies  strongly  across  countries,  with  Britain  having  the  lowest 
elasticity (0.35 or 0.49 depending on the model specifications), and the Netherlands having 
the highest (2.02). The importance of wage on participation seems, however, to be in decline. 
Covering the period from 1978 to 2002 in the United States, Heim (2007) estimates that the 
participation wage elasticity has decreased by 95 percent, from 0.66 to 0.03. Therefore, even 
if the historical decline in the gender gap in participation could at least partly be attributed to 
the decrease in the gender wage gap, it is unlikely to have such a strong impact in the future.
The effect of non-labor income on married women's participation has been reported to have 
been rather small even as far back as 1970s, and it has been in constant decline ever since 
(Heim 2007). Furthermore, research suggests that the wives of men with high income seem to 
have actually increased their labor force participation more than wives of low-income men, at 
the same time as slowdown in male earnings was weakest for the former and strongest for the 
latter (Juhn & Murphy 1997). Therefore, one's husband's income is unlikely to be a significant 
factor in explaining the late rise in women's participation at least in the United States.
There are a number of reasons which can be used to explain the aforementioned declines in 
both married women's participation wage elasticity, and their participation non-labor income 
elasticity.  Concerning  the  responsiveness  to  a  change  in  wages,  women's  jobs  may have 
become more similar to those of men's in terms of training required or the type of work that 
women  are  likely  to  participate  in.  Furthermore,  women's  careers  could  have  gained  in 
symbolic value whereas before taking care of the household was seen as women's foremost 
responsibility. As women's work has thus began to more and more resemble that of men, the 
wage elasticities  of  the two genders  have also converged.  On the other  hand,  changes in 
marital behavior are perhaps the most important factor explaining the decline in the non-labor 
income effect. As divorce rates have soared, women have begun to place less trust on being 
able to tap into family income in the future, decreasing the power of the income effect. Wage 
labor is thus seen as insurance for the future (Goldin 1990; Heim 2007), a line of thought 
which will be developed further in the chapter presenting household bargaining models. 
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The research presented above was mainly concerned about changes in women's employment 
with respect to wages and non-labor income at the micro-level. It is interesting, however, that 
things seem to be different when comparing countries at the aggregate level: Countries with 
low gender wage gaps seem to actually have high gender participation gaps. For example, the 
aggregate gender wage gaps are relatively wide in the US and the UK, but gender gaps in 
LFPRs are relatively narrow in these countries. This situation is largely reversed in Southern 
European countries. One possible explanation for this could be that low wages incur higher 
demand from the employers, resulting in higher participation. However, this seems somewhat 
unlikely as it would require large-scale wage discrimination which is illegal. Selection bias is 
therefore a more likely factor to explain this phenomenon. By using alternative imputation 
techniques,  Olivetti  and Petrongolo  (2008)  have  sought  to  recover  wages  of  unemployed 
workers,  allowing  them  to  compare  the  implied  human  capital  differences  between  the 
employed  and  the  unemployed.  As  only  employed  people  contribute  to  forming  wage 
estimates, nonrandom selection in the employment process can severely bias the estimation. 
According to the authors' conservative estimations, the selection bias could explain around 
45% of the observed negative correlation between wages and employment levels between 
different countries. They also note that correcting for this bias brings women’s wages in many 
Southern European countries in line with the likes of United States and Northern European 
countries. The idea of the role of selection bias in the workforce is also supported by Hunt 
(1997) who has studied changes in employment levels after the German unification. In the 
five years after the unification, the wages for female East German workers rose from being 
74% of male wages to a figure of 84%. At the same time women’s employment rate decreased 
from 84% to 63%, whereas the same figure for men decreased only from 94% to 78%. The 
author shows that 40% of the increase in female wages can be attributed to the selective 
withdrawal of East German women from employment. After the unification, low-earning East 
German workers were more likely to be laid off when the wages began to converge towards 
West German levels. As women were more likely than men to have low wages, this resulted 
in relative an increase in aggregate wages and a decrease in aggregate employment.
To conclude, it seems that historically the decreasing gender wage gap has had a significant 
impact  on the  declining  gender  participation  gap by increasing  the  incentive  to  work for 
women. Thus, classic labor supply theory is to some extent consistent with the narrowing of 
the gap. Furthermore, the persistence of the gap in participation could be seen as a logical 
consequence  of  the  persisting  gap  in  wages.  However,  the  model  runs  into  trouble  in 
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explaining  recent  decreases  in  the  gender  gap  in  participation,  as  the  wage  elasticity  for 
participation for women is nowadays close to zero. Furthermore,  the use of this model is 
problematic at the macro-level, as selection of the work force overrides the wage effect. Even 
when this is accounted for,  we can observe different participation gaps with similar wage 
gaps. Thus, other factors must be used to explain variation in participation gaps.
4.2 Human Capital
According to the human capital approach, differences in the labor force participation rates, or 
the  wage  rates,  between  genders  are  at  least  partly  due  to  differences  in  human  capital 
investments between genders. Usually human capital investment is seen to take two forms. 
First, human capital can be accumulated through formal education. Therefore, differences in 
labor  market  performances  between  genders  could  be  explained  through  differences  in 
educational attainment. However, assuming that both genders have similar initial abilities, this 
brings  us  to  the  question  why  there  are  differences  in  educational  levels.  A number  of 
explanations are possible here. For example, the two genders could just different preferences 
concerning education  and their  future  working life.  It  is  also  possible  that  the  returns  to 
education are different between genders, which would result in different educational levels. 
We saw with the models of statistical discrimination how such a situation could become self-
fulfilling. Finally, differences in educational levels between genders could also be the result of 
discrimination: Parents could be more reluctant to put girls in the school, or teachers could be 
more  supportive  for  male  students.  Besides  formal  education,  human capital  can  also  be 
accumulated  through  on-the-job  training.  Again,  differences  in  the  training  levels  could 
emerge because of discrimination.  Another, and perhaps more credible,  way of explaining 
differences in training levels between the two genders is that women are more likely than men 
to  experience  gaps  in  their  lifetime  working  time  due  to  childbearing  and  childrearing. 
Because of this, employers might be reluctant to invest in women's training as the returns for 
this investment would be smaller.
Polachek  (1981)  presents  a  model  on  how  human  capital  approach  can  explain  gender 
differences in occupational structure but it can be just as well be utilized in explaining the 
gender  gap  in  labor  force  participation  rates  by  denoting  household  work  as  one  of  the 
occupations. In his model, an individual faces an optimization problem:
max
s , 
T−H−SW  , IK S,  (4.1)
where T is the age of retirement minus five (potential lifetime spent on production), H is the 
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number of years spent on domestic work, S is the lifetime investment measured by years spent 
in  school,  δ is  a  vector  characteristics  describing  type  of  human  capital  K,  and  hence 
occupation, I is a vector of individual characteristics, W(δ,I) is the rental rate per unit of type 
δ human capital for and individual of characteristics I and K(S,δ) is lifetime amount of human 
capital.
For  simplicity's  sake,  Polachek  narrows  the  notion  of  occupational  structure  δ to  one 
component,  atrophy (δ),  which  tells  us  the loss  of  earnings  potential  when skills  are  not 
continuously used. Occupations with quick technological progress would have a high atrophy 
rate, as it would be hard to return to such a field after a period of absence. If losses of human 
capital stock truly yield lower earnings, it is necessary for the employers to compensate this 
possibility by giving higher  wages in  fields where this  phenomenon is  strong. Therefore, 
wages should be increasing with increasing levels of atrophy. Therefore, let us specify the 
rental rate for different occupation so that:
∂W
∂ 
0 ; ∂
2 W
∂2
0 ; ∂W
∂ I
≠0; ∂
2 W
∂∂ I
≠0  (4.2)
Polachek also assumes that human capital can be accumulated with investments and that high 
rates  of  atrophy tend to  decrease human capital.  Thus,  lifetime human capital  when  δ is 
defined as atrophy can be defined as:
K S,=1−HS ; ∂S
∂S
0  (4.3)
Now, the maximization of lifetime income comes from the function:
max
s , 
Y=T−H−SW  , I1−HS  (4.4)
This yields the following first order conditions:
YS=−W  , I K S ,T−H−SW  , I
∂
∂S
=0  (4.5)
Y=1−
Hs ∂W
∂
−W  , I SH 1−H−1=0  (4.6)
Now, we can look how the time used on childbearing and -rearing affects one's occupational 
choice. From the first order conditions we get:
d
dH
=
Y s YsH−YH YSS
Y  YSS−Ys Ys
0  (4.7)
Thus, as the time spent outside the labor force or education increases in one's lifetime, there is 
a change in preferred occupation towards those where the depreciation of work experience is 
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smaller. Therefore, women are more likely to be employed to sectors where there is less need 
for sector specific skills. Alternatively, they could remain outside of the formal labor force 
altogether and work at home. As wages are highest in sectors needing specific skills, women 
also  experience  a  gender  gap  in  earnings.  According  to  the  model,  women  will  end  up 
investing less into human capital, assuming that they take the structure of the labor market 
into account  when making investment  decisions (Polachek 1981).  Following the idea that 
women would be less likely to work at highly specialized fields, human capital theory predicts 
that the gender gap in labor force participation rate would be narrower in countries with little 
extremely specialized industries: As the depreciation rate for highly specialized skills is large, 
women would have more trouble of getting and holding formal employment in these fields. 
Conversely,  if  a  country mainly relied on simpler  forms of  production where no specific 
human capital was needed, women would be equally equipped as men to hold an occupation 
despite  spending  time  away  from  work  due  to  childbearing.  Having  measured  the  skill 
specificity  by vocational  training  intensity  and firm tenure  rates,  Iversen  and Rosenbluth 
(2006) report that the labor force participation rate for women is statistically significantly 
lower in countries with highly skill specific industrial structures. The same relationship does 
not hold for men, implying that women are more susceptible to human capital attrition due to 
their  family  responsibilities.  Finally,  human  capital  theory  implies  that  facilitation  of 
continuous careers for women should decrease gender gap in participation, as women would 
face smaller attrition rates for human capital. Maternal leave policies are one way of doing 
this, as they allow women to retain their jobs when giving birth. We will look into this issue 
with more detail in chapter 5.2 where the effect of maternal leave policies on participation is 
assessed in more detail. 
One further note to make concerning the human capital theory above is that it can easily lead 
to statistical discrimination if we assume that part of the human capital is accumulated as on-
the-job-training.  Assuming at  least  some women are willing to  temporarily exit  the labor 
market to give birth, employers could be inclined to concentrate their investment into men to 
minimize the human capital attrition among their workforce. As employers would be unable 
separate women who are going to give birth in the future from those who are not, women 
would suffer irrespective of their personal preferences.
The effect  of  human capital  on the probability of  labor  force  participation has  also been 
assessed  empirically.  A high amount  of  human capital  should  increase  participation  as  it 
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makes a person competent for a wider range of jobs. As noted before, human capital can be 
operationalized as years spent at school or as previous work experience, with the former being 
most commonly used in empirical work. There seems to be a clear connection between the 
level of education and the probability of labor force participation, holding in many different 
Western countries. For example, for Jewish women in Israel, and extra year of schooling has 
increased the probability of female labor force participation by around 3.5% (Ben-Porath & 
Gronau 1985). In Holland the impact is also strong, as the probabilities of the labor force 
participation for a woman with only primary education, with extended primary education, 
with  secondary  education  and  with  higher  education  being  64%,  70%,  81%  and  95% 
respectively (Hartog & Theeuwes 1985).  In  Spain the participation rates  for  women with 
primary education, secondary education and university education were 19%, 40% and 73% 
respectively (Hernandez,  Iglesisas & Riboud 1985).  In the United States,  increases in  the 
educational attainment can be seen as explaining around a quarter of the increase in women's 
LFPR (Michael 1985)12. However, the problem with the studies mentioned above is that they 
all fail to account for the potential endogeneity of educational and labor force participation 
choices:  It  is  entirely possible,  and even quite likely,  that women who plan to participate 
actively in the labor markets in the future will decide to seek higher education, as this will  
probably  give  them  greater  options  and  higher  rewards  later  on.  Therefore,  we  cannot 
establish a causal link between the level of human capital and the labor force participation 
rate.
4.3 Household Models
For the supply of labor, the gendered division of work within the household is perhaps the 
most important factor in explaining the gender gap in labor force participation rates. For the 
purpose of this study, it is useful to assume that there is one adult male and one adult female  
in the household, with addition of an unspecified number of children. If all adult members of 
the household are not working in the labor markets, women are far more likely than men to 
stay at home in order to take of childrearing and other household chores. Therefore, the labor 
force participation rate for married women is considerably lower than that of women living 
alone (Goldin 1990).
Ott  (1995)  defines  the  role  of  the  households  as  follows.  Households  are  regarded  as 
production places of basic commodities. It is assumed that they offer a possibility to gain 
12 Besides the research noted above, education is almost always included as a control variable when looking at 
participation probabilities, implying that its impact is taken almost as a given in labor supply research.
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extra profits for the members by enabling pooling of resources, division of labor, and intra-
family exchange. We can then show at least three types of family transactions that generate 
surplus: First, as a production company the family members can use comparative advantage 
by specializing in either household work or market work in conjunction with intra-household 
trading.  This  could  be  seen as  the  underlying  reason behind the  historically strict  sexual 
division of labor: It has been assumed that women have a competitive advantage in household 
work and men in the market work. Therefore, men have worked outside the household and 
then  supported  the  upkeep  of  the  household  from  their  wage  income.  Besides  being  a 
productive  company,  households  can  be  seen  as  consumer  cooperatives  where  household 
members can use indivisible resources together and enjoy economies of scale. For example, 
many modern home appliances, such as washing machines, have relatively high fixed costs 
creating  savings  for  households  of  multiple  members.  Third,  households  can  work  as 
insurance coalitions where family provides security through implicit promises of mutual aid. 
However, Ott goes on to argue that all of these gains have become less important over time. 
Specialization is no longer as efficient because most traditional household goods now have 
market substitutes. Combined with increases in wages, having one member concentrating on 
household production has become less and less efficient. Furthermore, family gains have been 
reduced by the  evolution  of  formal  insurance  as  well  as  by the  emerging social  security 
system. Overall this is consistent with the convergence in participation rates between the two 
genders.
The full realization of potential household gains requires binding long-term contracts within 
the  family.  This  is  especially  important  when it  comes  to  insurance,  as  an  unpredictable 
insurance policy is rarely of much use. However, as the marriage is legally considered mostly 
as  a  cooperative  venture,  most  of  the  transactions  have  no  official  status.  Therefore,  the 
potential advantages gained from marriage depend highly on whether people are altruistically 
willing to honor the explicit and implicit contracts they have made. Alternatively, household 
members could seek their personal benefits at all time. In line with this argument, household 
models are usually divided to altruistic household models and household bargaining models. 
The  former  models  assume  altruistic  behavior  within  the  household,  which  allows  its 
members to fully take advantage of the aforementioned gains. The latter models assume that 
both time and resource allocation within the household are subject to bargaining and try to 
depict different factors affecting the bargaining outcome.
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4.3.1 Model of Altruistic Households
Becker  (1993)  gives  an  account  of  an  altruistic  household  model  and  its  impact  on 
specialization within households. Assume a household with multiple members and that those 
members allocate their  time between market and household work. There are two types of 
human capital which affect the productivity of work done in different sectors. Human capital 
is  accumulated  by  an  initial  investment  and  after  that  is  held  at  a  stationary  level. 
Furthermore, assume that members of the household are altruistic and that there are no costs 
of supervision or fixed costs of allocating time between different sectors of work. We could 
then formulate the stationary output after the initial investment period for a household of n 
members as:
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where Ĥ1i and Ĥ2i are the optimal capital stocks for market and domestic works respectively, 
tw is the time allocated to market work, th is the time allocated to domestic work, aĤ1i is the 
wage rate, thψ(Ĥ2i) is the effective amount of household time and px is the price of market 
goods.  Furthermore, there is a limited amount of time to be spent in market and domestic 
work so that:
twth=t
'  (4.9)
From the function 4.8 we can see that if each member of the household had the same amount 
and distribution of  human capital,  production  would  depend only on the aggregate hours 
supplied  to  each  sector  and  not  on  the  distribution  of  hours  between  members  of  the 
household. However, if the human capital levels of the household members were to differ, 
production would depend also on the distribution of time between members as some members 
would be more productive in one sector and some on the other sector. Output would then be 
maximized if the marginal products in the household sector equaled the marginal products in 
the market sector for members supplying time for both sectors. More formally:
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We  can  define  the  comparative  advantage  of  a  household  member  by  comparing  the 
productivities in market and domestic work between the two household members. Function 
4.10 shows us that the marginal products for the two kinds of work only differ with respect to 
relative human capital levels ψ(H2) and H1, as all the other variables are common. Therefore, 
the relative levels of human capital within the household would be the sole determinants of 
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the division of labor (Becker 1993).
If all the members in a household have different comparative advantages, no more than one 
person would allocate  their  time between the market  and the household sectors  as others 
would fully concentrate on either type of work. Following from this, if all members have 
different  comparative  advantages,  only one  member  of  the  household  will  invest  in  both 
market  and  household  capital.  If  we  further  assume  constant  or  increasing  returns  for 
commodity  production  functions,  the  specialization  becomes  more  distinct  as  then  all 
members of the household will specialize in just one of the sectors (Becker 1993). The model 
can thus be used to explain why women have lower labor force participation rate and lower 
wage rates than men, assuming people will marry and act efficiently and altruistically.  As 
there is a possibility that women will  be spending at least  some part of their lives in the 
domestic  sphere  due  to  childbearing,  they  will  have  greater  incentives  than  men  in 
accumulating household capital. On the other hand, as men do not have a similar “natural” 
interruption in their work lives, they will invest more in the accumulation of market capital  
and consequently have a comparative advantage in that sphere. This effect can be emphasized 
by the attrition of the human capital, as shown in the human capital model above. Differences 
in participation levels across countries would thus again be explained by different types of 
capital needed in production. Overall the model predicts that there will be differences between 
the genders in the type of accumulated human capital, and therefore also in the allocation of 
time between markets work and household work,  even though there are no differences in 
initial skill levels.
Becker's idea of altruistic household has drawn some criticism concerning its assumptions 
about  human  behavior.  The  main  problem  for  the  critics  has  been  the  assumption  that 
members of the household will pool their resources and then distribute them equally.  The 
critics assert  that members of the household are more likely to keep at least  part  of their 
individual earnings, giving the member specializing in market labor a higher level of utility. 
Therefore, the acceptance of the model of altruistic households can be seen as having adverse 
effects on women as it could be used to hide unequal distribution of income within a family 
(Braunstein & Folbre 2001). There is also some empirical research to support this claim. For 
example, by studying how inputs are used in family agriculture in Burkina-Faso, Udry (1996) 
shows that inputs are used much more intensively on husbands' fields. Assuming equal initial 
productivities for fields and diminishing returns for inputs, this results in a loss of production 
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for  the  household.  If  the  household  were  truly  altruistic,  inputs  would  be  used  in  equal 
measure to maximize production. In a study concerning Thailand, Scuhltz (1990) shows that 
the owner of the non-labor income matters in labor supply: If this revenue is owned by the 
wife,  it  decreases  her  labor  supply  six  times  more  than  if  it  is  owned  by the  husband. 
Furthermore, Lundberg, Pollak and Wales (1997) report that shifting child support payments 
from husbands to wives in the UK also changed household spending habits. In an altruistic 
household the owner of the income should not matter as all the income would be pooled. As 
the utility conclusions derived from the model of altruistic households seem to be false, its 
usage in describing participation should also be avoided.
4.3.2 Household Bargaining Models
Household bargaining models seek to improve altruistic household models by bringing the 
possibility of conflicting interests into the mix. Therefore, household bargaining models hold 
elements of both cooperation and conflict. As in the model of altruistic households, people 
usually divide their  time between market labor  and household labor.  They can also make 
human capital investments to influence their future labor profiles. The main difference is that 
instead of maximizing household utility, individual members of the household maximize their 
own utility. This also brings the possibility of breaking up the household into the models: 
Members of the household stay in cooperative arrangements (marriage) as long as they are 
better-off than in the case of non-cooperation (divorce). However, there are many different 
cooperative equilibria and, therefore, there is an underlining conflict even when the system of 
cooperation is pursued. Equilibrium is reached through a bargaining process which is often 
described through models of game theory.
The main advantage of the household bargaining models is that they allow us to model a 
system where all household members occupy themselves in both market work and household 
work.  The  threat  of  divorce  hinders  complete  specialization,  as  household  members  are 
reluctant to risk the drastic drop in income for the one specializing in household work. It is 
clear how the informal nature of the marriage contract thus decreases potential household 
gains. Bargaining models also allow us to understand labor supply decisions in a much wider 
context. Besides the question of divorce, it is especially useful in understanding how labor 
supply is connected to demographic change, namely changes in fertility. Historically,  high 
fertility levels have been associated with wide gender gaps in LFPRs, as women have stayed 
home to take care of the children. Lately, however, this association has been disappearing, and 
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there have even been suggestions that narrow gender gaps would be related to high fertility 
rates13.  This would be consistent  with bargaining models:  Working women would be less 
reluctant  to take the risk of giving birth,  as they could still  support  themselves and their 
children through their own work after a divorce.
Bargaining  models  have,  however,  also  faced some criticism.  Agarwal  (1997)  raises  five 
issues which are critical to bargaining outcomes, but which are treated as exogenous in the 
models or are not mentioned at all. First, bargaining power is defined only in terms of fall-
back  positions  which  are  calculated  by  the  potential  income.  This  definition  almost 
completely excludes  the qualitative aspects of power, and is a valid criticism for all of the 
models covered in this chapter. Second, the relative importance of factors determining the 
fall-back position is rarely explored. This is important when we consider bargaining in poor 
conditions  where  mere  subsistence  would  be  crucial  for  the  fall-back  position.  Agarwal 
suggests that in such a situation the effective command over landed property should carry a 
relatively high  importance.  When considering  bargaining in  a  rich  world,  as  most  of  the 
literature covered here does, this is unlikely to be a problem. Third, the role of social norms in 
determining bargaining power is rarely explored, including the possibility that these norms are 
themselves subject to bargaining. Although not considered strictly in a bargaining context, we 
shall  assess  the  impact  of  norms  on labor  force  outcomes  later  on.  The  fourth  criticism 
Agarwal rises is that individuals could have different perceptions about needs and pursuit of 
self-interest. Following this view, women could end up in a worse position in bargaining if 
they were not “selfish” enough. This is a somewhat valid criticism of the models covered 
here, as we assume people to have similar preferences. On the other hand, the difficulty of 
formulating models with differing preferences forces us to accept this simplification. Finally, 
the links between intra-household bargaining and bargaining outside the household are rarely 
covered. There have been some attempts to correct this problem: For example, we mentioned 
in the introduction a study by Iversen and Rosenbluth (2008), where the authors showed that 
women's  political  representation  was  higher  in  countries  where  they  are  more  likely  to 
participate in the labor markets. As participation in the labor markets can be seen to increase 
bargaining power in the household, this would imply a connection between bargaining power 
in the household and bargaining power in the society.
13 See chapter 4.4 for details.
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A model by Manser and Brown (1980) is a good example of a classic household bargaining 
model14.  In  this  model,  two  members  of  the  household  bargain  in  order  maximize  their 
respective utilities. They both can either work in the markets to receive wages or enjoy from 
leisure. Wages are used to buy products from the markets. Products can either be such that 
both persons can utilize them without a loss, or they can be utilized by only one member of 
the household.  Naturally,  each member would like the other member to buy the common 
goods so that they could use most of their income on individual goods. Threat point is a 
crucial feature of the model: It depicts the level of utility each person has to get from the 
marriage in order for it to be made the preferred option as opposed to living alone. The higher  
the utility level outside the household for a particular member, the higher their bargaining 
position will be within the marriage as they have less to lose in marriage discharge. Therefore, 
the  model  describes  how differences  in  wages  and  prices  can  affect  the  intra-household 
allocation of time and products, and thus also participation. Furthermore, the model can also 
be used to estimate under which conditions marriage is likely to break down. However, one 
problem for this model is that it does not contain human capital. Thus, work decisions made 
today do not affect future, as is done in more advanced models.
Lundberg and Pollak (1993) have developed a “separate spheres” model of bargaining within 
marriage.  The idea in  the model  is  that,  due to  gender  norms,  men and women produce 
different public goods within the marriage. Differing from the model above, separate spheres 
model  has  three  possible  outcomes:  cooperation  within  marriage,  non-cooperation  within 
marriage, and breaking the marriage apart by divorce.  The first  outcome occurs when the 
utility gained from marriage is above the threat point, which is naturally determined by the 
utilities in the other outcomes. As in other models, in the cooperative outcome the equilibrium 
values of private and public production are those that maximize the gains from cooperation. 
The divorce outcome is also similar to the model above. The biggest difference comes from 
the non-cooperative outcome in the marriage where each partner provides public goods by 
choosing actions maximizing their  own utility when other  person's  decisions are  taken as 
given. This leads to sub-optimal production of public goods without breaking up the marriage. 
A non-cooperative  marriage  may  most  likely  take  place  if  divorce  involves  substantial 
transaction costs. For example, housing could impact both of these factors. First, looking for a 
new house invokes transaction costs at least in the short run and can make divorce seem like a 
bad option. Second, housing prices per area are usually decreasing in size and therefore, a 
14 For another classic model of household bargaining, see McElroy & Horney (1981).
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household with multiple members receives scale benefits. 
Ott (1995) has presented a more ambitious marriage bargaining model by incorporating a time 
variant into the bargaining process. Both of the parties would like to work on the markets, as 
the human capital gained from it increases one's utility in case of a divorce in the future, and 
therefore one's threat point in bargaining during the marriage. The Nash-solution of the intra-
household bargaining is characterized as:
max
x
N=Um x −Dm ∗Uf x−Df 
s.t.x ' p=Y
Umx Dm
U f xDf
 (4.11)
where  x is  the  vector  of  goods produced in the household,  Ui(x)  is  the  individual  utility 
function  of  a  male  (i=m)  and  the  female  (i=f),  Di is  the  utility  outcome  in  the  case  of 
disagreement (breakup of marriage), Y is the family income and p is the vector of prices.
If the conflict point (threat point) (Dm, Df) lies within the utility frontier, there are gains to be 
had  from  the  marriage  and  it  stays  intact.  Furthermore,  let  us  assume  that  in  case  of 
disagreement people can only live alone.  In a single-person household,  the indirect utility 
function is:
Dip , Y i=max U ix 
s.t. x ' p=Yi
 (4.12)
where Yi is the income of person i living alone. Now, a change in prices in favor of one of the 
persons  in  the  household  can  have  an  effect  on  the  household  bargaining outcome,  as  a 
person's  threat  point  changes.  If  bargaining  outcome can no longer  be  reached,  marriage 
breaks down.
Figure 7 shows what will take place if the prices change in the favor of person f.  The initial 
bargaining  point  A lays  at  the  utility  frontier  I.  The  movement  from point  A to  point  B 
represents the compensated substitution effect, and the movement from point B to point C the 
income effect. The final movement from point C to point D can be interpreted as a change in 
bargaining outcome caused by the increase in power for the person f. As their bargaining 
positions change, so does the form of the indifference curve (Ott 1995).
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Source: Ott 1995, 84.
This approach can also be made to consist of multiple time periods. With the assumptions of 
individual utility functions that are inter-temporally additive and use of an explicit household 
production  function  Z,  the  intra-household  Nash-bargaining  model  can  more  formally  be 
described as follows (Ott 1995):
max
Li1 ,H i1 , M i1
N=Um1Um2−Dm ∗U f1Uf2−Df  (4.13)
max
Li2 , Hi2 , M i2
N2=U
m2−Dm2∗U f2−Df2  (4.14)
subject to (besides non-negativity constraint):
CmtCft=Za mt Hmtaft H ft, Xt (household production in each period)
Xt=Y wmt Mmtw ft MftImtIft  (budget constraint in each period)
T=M itHitLit (time constraint in each period)
wi2=f wi1 ,M i1 (accumulation of human capital for market work)
a i2=f a i1 , Hi1 (accumulation of human capital for household work)
Di2wi2 , a i2 , Ii2 (conflict outcome in period 2, which is the solution of utility maximization 
problem in a single-person household)
In the equations above Lit is leisure of person i in period t, Hit is hours of work at home of 
person i in period t, Mit is hours of market work of person i in period t, Uit is utility of person i 
in period t and based on consumption and leisure, Di is conflict payoff of person i in period 1, 
Cit is  consumption  of  person  i  in  period  t,  Z  is  household  production  function,  a it is 
productivity of household work of person i in period t, Xt is market goods in period t, Y is net 
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Figure 7: Price change: income, substitution  
and bargaining effect
income function, wit is wage of person i in period t and Iit is non-wage income of person i in 
period t. Solving the maximization problem leads to the following condition for the allocation 
of time:
M
i ZY YM w
i1=ZH a
i1H
i  (4.15)
where Ψim and Ψif stand for weighted sums of marginal utilities of both spouses in period 2, ZY 
stands for change in household production when net income changes, YM stands for change in 
net  income  when  hours  of  market  work  change  and  ZH stands  for  change  in  household 
production when hours of household work change.
The counterpart for the equation above in the model of altruistic households would be:
ZH a
i1=ZY YM w
i1 (4.16)
As can be seen when comparing functions 4.15 and 4.16, the latter lacks the components of 
period 2 utility when solving the time allocation problem in period 1. As altruistic models 
assume that all income will be pooled, there is no need to assess future utilities.
In conjunction with the human capital approach, wages depend partly on exogenous factors 
and partly on investment in human capital in the form of on-the-job training as can be seen in 
the constraint  describing the wage rate  in period 2.  Thus,  besides bringing actual  income 
today, employment also increases future human capital and therefore future earning potential. 
In  a  similar  manner,  doing  household  work  in  period  1  increases  one's  productivity  in 
household work in period 2. Therefore, intra-household specialization in period 1 affects the 
future earnings potential of the household members in market work. If one specializes in the 
household  labor,  one's  potential  future  earnings  decrease  due  to  a  lesser  accumulation  of 
market human capital. This will result in a decrease in bargaining power within the marriage, 
as  the  reservation  utility  at  the  threat  point  of  divorce  decreases  due  to  smaller  earning 
potential  in  market  work.  As  household  contracts  are  not  binding for  a  lifetime,  rational 
members of the household are likely to take future changes in the threat point into account 
when making specialization decisions. Therefore, the time allocation between labor markets 
and  household  work  within  the  household  is  chosen  with  both  maximum  household 
production and future bargaining position in mind. When looking at the equation 4.16, we can 
see that if wages and household skills differ between the spouses, the equation for altruistic 
households can hold for only one of the spouses, implying complete specialization. In the 
bargaining model 4.15, the equation can hold for both spouses even with different wages and 
household skills. Therefore, complete specialization is not the optimal allocation of time in all 
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cases, making the bargaining model more flexible than the model of altruistic households.
Household bargaining models can be tested by looking at the connection between marriage 
dissolution and labor force participation. High marriage rates could be connected with high 
labor force participation for both genders, as people would use work as insurance in case of a 
divorce.  On the  other  hand,  one can think that  high employment levels  could  also cause 
divorce figures to rise, as neither party of the marriage would be in a severely disadvantaged 
position if the dissolution of the marriage took place. South (2001) has studied the effects of 
wives' employment on marital dissolution over time in the United States. The results show 
that for women the number of hours spent in paid employment is statistically significantly and 
positively correlated with martial dissolution. With men, the hours worked have no statistical 
significance which could be interpreted so that men already work outside the household at a 
sufficient level, and therefore additional working hours have less of an impact on their threat 
points. South also finds out that the effect of women's hours worked on the divorce risk has 
grown over time, which might have been caused by changes in institutions such as family-
leave  policies,  child-care  facilities,  work  flexibility,  or  by  the  liberalization  of  gender 
attitudes. Finally, the risk of marital dissolution is lower for homeowners than for renters. This 
is consistent with the idea that the transaction costs of breaking up a marriage can hinder the 
decision to do so. Furthermore,  Genadek, Stock and Stoddard (2007) have studied how no-
fault divorce laws impact female labor force participation. Theoretically, the presence of a no-
fault divorce law should increase participation as women would hedge against the possibility 
of an easier divorce. This effect should be stronger for women with children, as the adverse 
effects of a divorce are arguably stronger for them. The authors find that for women with 
children under the age of six, a no-fault divorce law is associated with a net 0.018 increase in 
the  probability  of  participation,  the  result  being  statistically  significant.  For  women  with 
children over the age of six, the effect is also positive, but no longer statistically significant. 
Somewhat surprisingly, the presence of a no-fault divorce law has a negative impact on the 
labor force participation of women with no children. This implies an increase in bargaining 
power either for women who prefer to stay home, or for men who want their wives to stay 
home. Furthermore, it should be noted that the effect is rather small in magnitude for all cases. 
Divorce  laws  are  thus  unable  to  explain  much  of  the  variation  in  the  gender  gap  in 
participation.
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To conclude, high divorce rates are likely to be connected to low gender gaps in participation 
through two effects. First, high number of divorces decreases the number of married women 
who are less likely to work than unmarried ones. Second, a high number of divorces increases 
the incentive for women to work during the marriage, as they cannot indefinitely on their 
marriages acting as insurance. On the other hand, high levels of employment also allow high 
number of divorces to take place, as people face smaller losses of income. Again it is difficult 
to determine what the direction of the causal effect is. 
4.4 Fertility
Intuitively having children would be associated with a decrease in female employment levels, 
as women would be forced to spend at least some time outside the labor force when giving 
birth. This effect would be strengthened by the tendency of women to take care of the young 
children at home, manifesting itself in an increase in their reservation wage and a decrease in 
employment. The association, however, is in truth far from clear. It is possible that fertility 
decisions are partially influenced by the employment status of women. As we saw with the 
marriage bargaining models, market work could be seen as a prerequisite for having children 
by providing insurance towards divorce. Furthermore, fertility and labor force participation 
decisions could both be related to preferences. If fertility and labor market decisions are made 
somewhat simultaneously, their exact relationship is hard to pin down.
Two distinct research methods have been used in trying to solve this problem and determine 
the  causal  relationship  between  fertility  and  female  labor  supply.  First,  one  can  utilize 
exogenous variation in the number of children to assess the impact of having a child on labor 
supply, as has been done by Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980). The authors look at how having 
twins in the first pregnancy affects future fertility and, more interestingly, later labor market 
behavior. The results indicate that although having twins as opposed to one child decreases 
labor force participation in the short run, this effect is likely to reverse in the long run. The 
results  are thus consistent with a model of stable lifetime market participation rate where 
participation is just adapted to transitory events during the life-cycle: When preferred number 
of children is reached early on in one's life, there is more time for labor force participation 
later  on.  This implies that fertility should have only limited impact on the gender  gap in 
LFPRs. It should also be noted that these results run somewhat against the idea of human 
capital attrition, as time spent outside of labor force early in the life-cycle does not seem to 
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have a negative effect on later participation15. Using a similar method while studying unwed 
mothers, Bronars and Grogger (1994) also arrive to the conclusion that fertility mainly affects 
labor  force participation in  the short  run with little  long-term effects.  Additional  research 
using  this  method  for  married  mothers  has  also  yielded  similar  results  (Gangadharan  & 
Rosenbloom  1996;  Jacobsen,  Pearce  &  Rosenbloom  1999).  Therefore,  a  higher  fertility 
should increase the gender gap in labor force participation for women close to childbearing 
age, but the effect should disappear when these women grow older. The problem with this 
type of research is that it is based on a “special” case of having children, namely having twins. 
It is therefore not altogether clear whether these results could be generalized to apply for the 
whole population. For example, there could be efficiency gains in household production for 
having two children at the same time, which would induce concentration for household labor 
and thus cause a decrease in women's labor market participation.
Another way to assess the relationship is by using instrumental variables to estimate fertility. 
Naturally, using this method makes the choice of these variables crucial for the reliability of 
the research. The early users of the instrumental variable technique in the 1970s and 1980s 
largely found negative coefficients on labor supply in the fertility equations, albeit not always 
statistically significant ones. However, the reliability of the instrumental variables used at this 
time period has seriously been called to question: The instrumental variables were often too 
weak or by themselves endogenous, or the identifying restrictions were arbitrary leading to 
sensitivity problems (Lehrer & Nerlove 1986). Lately, some more promising attempts have 
taken place.  For example,  Angrist  and Evans (1998) utilize parental  preference for mixed 
sibling-sex composition16 in constructing instrumental variable estimates. As the variation in 
the  sex-composition  of  a  given  family  is  close  to  random,  this  should  take  care  of  the 
problems in IV-estimates discussed above. In their estimation on US census data from the 
years 1980 and 1990,  the authors  find that  fertility seems to have a  decreasing effect  on 
female labor supply: Having a third child reduces supply of labor by around 20 to 30 percent.  
The  effect  is  smaller  than  when  measured  in  OLS-method  implying  that  simple  OLS-
estimates might exaggerate the impact of fertility on labor supply. Furthermore, the effect is 
slightly stronger for the group of married women than for all women. Overall, the authors 
estimate that decline in the number of families with more than two children could account for 
an increase of approximately 2 percentage points in employment for women aged 21 to 35 
15 Attrition could still, however, have an effect on wages, but that was not covered in this piece of research.
16 Parents with two same-sex children are substantially and significantly more likely to have third child than 
parents with two children of different sex.
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from 1970 to 1990. However, as the overall increase in employment over this period was 21.8 
percentage points, other explanations must also be sought. Using a similar method, Cruces 
and  Galiani  (2007)  find  that  these  results  hold  both  qualitatively  and  quantitatively  in 
Argentina and Mexico.
The method of using same-sex composition as an instrumental variable  for fertility has been 
criticized by Rosenzweig and Wolpin (2000). Based on their data in India, the authors suspect 
that part of the incentive of having a third child in case of the first two being of the same sex 
could be attributed to hand-me-down cost savings, which occur if for example clothes can be 
handed down to younger siblings. However, these savings are more important when children's 
clothing takes a substantial part of the family income and therefore, it is probably a matter of 
concern only when studying poor regions. 
Another problem with the research presented above is that it only concerns the case of having 
a third child. This has been overcome by Cristia (2008) who has applied IV-method to assess 
the effect of having a first child by studying women who are seeking fertility services: As all 
these women want to have a child, and having one is uncorrelated to their employment status, 
it is possible to observe changes in their labor supply after giving birth later. The author finds 
that the labor supply of women who had a child is around 25 percentage points lower 20 
months after beginning treatment than those who did not have a child but began the treatment 
at the same time period. Unfortunately we do not have knowledge of the labor supply after a 
longer period of time. Therefore, these results could still be consistent with the idea of a set 
level  of  lifetime  employment.  Bloom  et  al.  (2009)  have  used  abortion  legislation  as  an 
instrumental  variable  when  assessing  the  effect  fertility  has  on  female  labor  force 
participation.  In a 97-country-data with fixed country effects, the authors find that a high 
fertility has a negative and statistically significant effect on female labor force participation 
rate.
There have also been a number of aggregate level studies concerning the relationship between 
fertility and labor supply. Historically there has been an inverse relationship between the total 
fertility rate and the female labor force participation rate at the country level. Some have 
suggested,  however,  that  in  the  1980s  the  cross-country  correlation  between  these  two 
variables  changed  signs,  meaning  that  lately  countries  with  higher  female  labor  force 
participation rates would also tend to have and higher fertility rates (Brewster & Rindfuss 
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2000; Ahn & Mira 2002). This would imply decreasing role incompatibility between working 
and  childbearing,  probably  caused  by  changes  in  values  as  well  as  by  institutional 
development. For example, availability of child-care, and attitudes towards its utilization, may 
have  changed  in  this  period,  allowing  more  women  to  combine  childrearing  with  work 
(Brewster & Rindfuss 2000; Rindfuss, Guzzo & Morgan 2003). Availability of part-time work 
and the level of unemployment have also been suggested as possible explanations: Increasing 
availability of part-time work could have facilitated the return of women to the workforce 
after giving birth. On the other hand, rising levels of unemployment, especially prevalent in 
Southern Europe,  could have led to  an increase in  “zero-earnings” households  which are 
detrimental to fertility (Ahn & Mira 2002). However, Kögel (2004) suggests that the time-
series association between fertility and female labor force participation has not changed as 
dramatically as the authors above claim. Instead, the observed changes in the cross-country 
correlation  have  two reasons.  First,  the  studies  have  not  taken country fixed  effects  into 
account and second, there is considerable heterogeneity in the time-series association between 
the variables. According to Kögel, the negative time-series association has persisted in the 
Mediterranean countries even after the 1980s, but the association has become insignificant in 
other parts of Europe covered in the research. Even though there has not been a change in sign 
per  se,  it  is  clear  that  the  negative  association  between  fertility  and  female  labor  force 
participation has overall become less important over time, as was shown be the disappearance 
of the positive correlation in some cases.
In conclusion, it is likely that having children decreases female labor force participation at the 
individual  level  and  in  the  short  run.  However,  it  seems  that  this  effect  decreases  for 
individuals as time progresses: After sufficient time women tend to reattach themselves to 
labor markets. Furthermore, research based on aggregate data suggests that while the negative 
correlation between fertility and female labor supply persists in some countries, the effect is 
not as consistent as it used to be. Claims of a change towards a positive correlation, however, 
remain  questionable.  Remembering  Ott's  (1995)  model,  the  possibility  of  lifelong 
employment could have pushed fertility rates down as women have become more reluctant to 
forgo future income, and the bargaining power attached to it. Following this, we could assume 
that the negative correlation between fertility and female employment is somewhat offset by 
women's stronger position in the labor markets: If women cannot safely bear children without 
the risk of exclusion from the working life later on, the number of children is likely to go 
down. On the other hand, if women are strongly attached to the labor markets, this risk is 
46
unlikely to materialize and both the labor force participation rate and the fertility rate can 
coexist at a relatively high level. Overall the evidence indicates that variation in fertility is 
unlikely to be the primary reason behind differences in the gender gap across countries. In 
contrast, the fact that women give birth is the most likely reason for the persistence of gender 
gap in the long run, as it can be deemed as the only biologically relevant factor in determining 
labor market participation. Finally, it seems likely that decreases in fertility can explain part of 
the decreasing trend in the gap, but it is also clear that childbearing and working are not  
fundamentally incompatible in the modern society. We will therefore next consider the impact 
certain institutions could have on the gender gap in LFPRs through facilitating continuing 
market work simultaneously to having children.
5 Policy Instruments, Technology and Informal Institutions
The specific institutional setting in a given country can have a strong impact on the gender 
gap in labor force participation rate. For example, Jaumotte (2003) found in a cross-country 
study that state support for child care, high relative tax levels for second earners, level of 
family allowances, availability of part-time work, length of paid parental leave and level of 
employment  protection  all  had  a  statistically  significant  impact  in  women's  labor  force 
participation rate. Some of these institutions are related to the division of labor within the 
households: High day care subsidies and low relative tax levels for second-earners and high 
family allowances decrease the reservation wage rate for a person not participating in the 
labor  markets.  On  the  other  hand,  the  availability  of  part-time  work  and  parental  leave 
policies are closely connected to the possibility of combining working and childrearing. The 
importance of institutional structure in determining women's labor force participation rate has 
also been emphasized by Del Boca & Sauer (2009): According to the simulations conducted 
by the authors, a favorable institutional structure could alter the female participation rate for 
as much as over 20 percentage points.
There are thus multiple ways in through which government policies can influence the gender 
gap in  participation.  Three  of  these  are  looked in  more  detail  in  this  chapter:  system of 
taxation, maternal leave policies and child care subsidies. Structural features are not, however, 
constrained  solely  to  state  actions.  Technological  progress  has  also  historically  been  an 
important factor in improving women's work possibilities. Finally, informal institutions such 
as  culture  can  affect  women's  labor  supply decisions  by skewing incentive  structures  for 
working. 
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5.1 Household Taxation
Taxation is clearly an important factor when people make decisions concerning their labor 
force participation as it impacts the final income that can be acquired from working. Taxation 
is for the most part, however, gender-neutral and therefore should not affect the gender gap in 
labor force participation. One crucial exception in this respect is the choice on how income 
within a household is taxed. Two main systems can be separated here. First, under a system of 
family taxation, income from all family members is pooled and the level of income tax is 
based on this pooled income. The second option is a system of individual taxation, where the 
tax level of each person of the household is based on their own income only. When compared 
to individual taxation, taxing households as one unit is likely to decrease female labor force 
participation, as it usually creates greater incentives for specialization within the household17.
The ending of the system of family taxation in the early 1970s in Sweden provides a “natural” 
experiment for studying its effect on female labor force participation. By studying the labor 
market positions of working-age women in 1969 and 1975, Selin (2009) estimates that the 
employment level in 1975 using the old tax system would have been around 10 percentage 
points  lower  than  it  actually  was.  Gustafsson  (1992)  has  also  studied  the  impact  of  the 
introduction of separate taxation on married women’s labor supply in Sweden by comparing 
micro data on wages, hours of work and human capital in Sweden and West Germany. As 
West Germany had at the time of the study a system of joint income taxation, it can be well 
used  as  a  comparison  for  the  reform  conducted  in  Sweden.  Gustafsson  estimates  that 
exchanging the tax systems between the two countries would have had a large impact on their  
respective women’s labor supplies: For Sweden, the author estimates that married women’s 
labor force participation rate would decrease from 80.2% to 60.4% if the West German tax 
system were to be applied there. In West Germany, the corresponding change would result in 
an  increase  of  the  married  women's  labor  force  participation  rate  from 50.3% to  60.0%. 
Slightly  lower  results  concerning  Germany  have  also  been  found  by  Haan  (2010)  who 
estimates that shifting to individual taxation would result in a 7 percent increase in female 
labor  force  participation rate.  In  a  similar  manner,  Smith  et  al. (2003)  have studied  how 
taxation affects married women's labor supply in four European countries: Britain, Ireland, 
Denmark and Germany. Again, the conducted simulations indicate that the taxation scheme 
could have a strong impact on women's labor force participation. For example, applying the 
17 Assuming a system of progressive taxation, increasing returns for human capital and differences in the 
human capital between the two spouses.
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Irish joint taxation scheme to Denmark would increase the non-participation rate of women 
from 11% to 74%. Even though a change of this magnitude seems unlikely, the overall results 
from various studies clearly indicate that the system of taxation can strongly affect the gender 
gap in labor force participation.
5.2 Maternal Leave Policies
Empirical  studies  concerning  the  effects  of  fertility  implied  a  decrease  in  women's 
participation in the short term. This could potentially be alleviated by state policies. However, 
the  effect  of  formal  maternal  leave  policies  on  women's  labor  supply  is  theoretically 
ambiguous. On the one hand, these policies could increase participation by allowing women 
to retain their jobs even if they needed some time off around giving birth. This would help 
them to reattach themselves to the labor markets after the initial time spent with their children, 
as the search costs of finding a new job would disappear (Baum 2003/I). This effect could be 
further reinforced by a lower level of attrition for the human capital coming from a quicker 
return to the labor market. On the other hand, maternal leave policies could also decrease 
women's  participation  by allowing women  to  stay longer  periods  outside  the  labor  force 
without a complete loss of income. Furthermore, maternal leave policies could also induce 
employers to avoid hiring women of childbearing age in the fear of increased labor costs18.
Waldfogel (1999) has studied how the introduction of Family and Medical Leave Act in the 
USA in 1993 has affected labor market outcomes, such as employment and wages. The act 
allowed qualified employees to have up to 12 weeks of leave for medical or family reasons, 
providing for the first time a federal maternity leave in the US. The results show that the 
introduction of the policy had no statistically significant effect on the women's employment. 
The author offers two ways to explain these results: First, it  is possible that the predicted 
increases  following  from easier  reattachment  were  offset  by  some  women  taking  longer 
leaves. Alternatively, it is also possible that neither of the effects had a significant impact on 
employment, implying that unofficial systems for maternity absences could already have been 
in place at the firm level before the implementation of the act. Studying the same act with a 
different data set, Baum's (2003/II) results concerning employment are largely similar: When 
controlling  for  demographic  variables,  state-specific  variables  and  year-specific  variables 
there is no statistically significant difference in employment between  mothers and various 
18 Besides effects on employment, maternal leaves could also have a positive effect on children's development 
if it allows women to stay at home for some time after giving birth (Baum 2003/I; Tanaka 2005). However, 
the adverse effects could also be alleviated by other institutional structures (Gregg et al. 2005).
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control groups19. Besides former unofficial arrangements, Baum states two additional reasons 
which could contribute to the absence of the effect. First, the relatively short length of the 
maternity leave  provided by the  act  might  be insufficient  to  cause significant  changes  in 
employment. Secondly, as the leave is unpaid, women might have to return to work rather 
quickly after giving birth due to financial reasons.
Somewhat different results have been found from Canada. Baker and Milligan (2008) found 
that short maternity leaves (around 20 weeks) caused women not to quit their jobs prior to 
giving birth. On the other hand, there was no indication that the new entitlement would have 
caused women to  change from working to  taking parental  leave after  giving  birth.  Short 
maternal leaves should, therefore, increase women's labor force participation. In the case of 
longer  leaves  (around  30  weeks),  significantly  more  mothers  switched  from working  to 
parental leave after giving birth, implying that long parental leaves could decrease women's 
participation.
There have also been attempts to study how differences in parental leave policies could affect 
women's employment across countries. Ruhm (1998) has studied the effect of parental leaves 
in women's employment-to-population (EP) ratios and wage levels in nine European countries 
by using data from 1969 to 1993. The results indicate that short leaves increase the EP-ratios 
of women by around 3 to 4 percent while having little effect on wages. On the other hand, 
longer leaves (over nine months) increase the female EP-ratios by around 4 percent while 
decreasing the female hourly earnings by around 3 percent. According to Ruhm, around one-
quarter  to  one-half  of  the  increase  in  the  EP-ratios  is  probably  caused  by the  statistical 
inclusion of people on parental leave to people who are employed. There are two primary 
factors  accounting  for  the  rest  of  the  effect.  First,  females  who  would  not  otherwise 
participate in the labor market might obtain a job before giving birth in order to enjoy benefits 
from parental leave. Second, the parental leave policies can speed up the new mothers' return 
to the labor market as they do not face the costs of finding new employment. Using a probit-
model, Waldfogel, Higuchi and Abe (1999) have additionally estimated that maternity leave 
coverage has a positive impact on job retention rate in the United States, Britain and Japan, 
implying a positive effect also on labor force participation.
19 There is no difference in wages either, when the same variables are controlled.
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In  conclusion,  the  empirical  research  concerning  the  effect  of  maternal  leave  on  female 
employment is not unanimous. The introduction of federal maternal leave policy had little 
effect  on  women's  employment  in  the  United  States  whereas  in  the  Western  Europe  and 
Canada  maternal  leave  policies  seem to  have  enhanced  women's  attachment  to  the  labor 
markets.  This  difference  could  perhaps  be  explained  by  the  difference  in  monetary 
compensation during the leave: Whereas the federal maternal leave in the US is unpaid, most 
European countries and Canada offer at least partly paid leaves. Compared to women from 
other countries described here, this creates monetary incentives for US women to return to 
work more quickly after giving birth. Finally, there is no consensus on whether long maternal 
leaves increase or decrease participation.
5.3 Child Care Costs
Since the late 1980s, there have been a number of studies concerning the relationship between 
child care costs and female labor force participation. High child care costs should lower the 
probability of labor force participation for women as the cost of taking care of the children 
offsets some of the wage gains acquired from working, thus decreasing the reservation wage 
rate. We should remember from the discussion on wage elasticities, however, that the impact 
of  a  change  in  wages  on  participation  is  not  necessarily  very  large.  Such  a  connection 
probably does not exist for men, as they are unlikely to stay at home and take care of the  
children  in  any case.  Subsidizing  or  providing free  market  child  care  by the government 
should therefore increase women's labor force participation through a higher increase in real 
income when switching from household work to market labor. Naturally,  supporting child 
care at home would have the opposite effect.
The consensus among researchers seems to be that high child care costs have a statistically 
significantly negative effect on women’s labor force participation.  Therefore,  subsidies on 
child care could offer a relatively simple way of supporting women's employment. However, 
the magnitude of the effect is still under debate as elasticity estimates vary considerably. Two 
reasons  can  be  thought  to  contribute  to  this.  First,  the  differences  could  be  a  result  of 
differences in data, i.e., women in different countries could react differently on changes in 
child  care  costs.  This  could  be  caused  by different  preferences  or  by  differences  in  the 
institutional  structures  between  countries.  Secondly,  differences  could  be  caused  by  the 
methodological  choices.  For  example,  Anderson  and  Levine  (1999)  present  three  main 
methods  that  have  been  used  in  estimating  how  the  cost  of  child  care  affects  mothers’ 
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employment decisions. First,  one can estimate a probit model on the discrete employment 
decision, on which the child care costs and wage rates are the key covariates. In this method 
sample corrections need to be made correct for the bias that only those paying for child care 
or  working are observed.  This  creates  some unreliability to  the results.  A second way to 
estimate the relationship is to construct a structural model based on utility maximization and 
assumptions  of  functional  forms.  The  problem  with  this  approach  is  that  the  assumed 
functional forms may not reflect individual behavior accurately. The third approach utilizes 
exogenous events to assess the problem. However, generalizations made from such natural 
experiments remain somewhat unreliable due to the  low number of research done with this 
method.
Blau  and Robins  (1988)  have  studied  the  effect  of  child  care  costs  on  married  women's 
employment in the United States by using a probit model where three child care possibilities 
exist: women can themselves stay at home; someone else (such as a relative) can take care if 
the children for free albeit with worse “quality”; or child care can be purchased from the 
markets. The authors find out that the cost of child care, measured by the site-average weekly 
cost of market care, has a negative and statistically significant effect on participation. Overall, 
the average price elasticity of employment over child care costs is estimated to be -0.38. By 
also using US data,  Connelly (1992) has largely reached the same conclusions as Blau and 
Robins (1988), but with an estimated price elasticity of -0.20 when measured at the mean 
values of probability and child care costs. Slightly higher price elasticity has been found by 
Ribar (1992) who reports an elasticity of -0.74 for mothers in the United States. According to 
Ribar, the smaller elasticities presented in other pieces of research are likely due to the fact 
that the expenditure on child care is measured per week rather than per hour of care per child. 
Therefore, the smaller elasticities probably capture a combination of both child care cost and 
child  care  utilization  effects.  Using  a  probit  model,  Kimmel  (1998)  has  sought  to  study 
whether child care costs have a different effect on the labor supply of single and married 
mothers in the United States. One could assume that child care costs would have less of an 
impact on the labor force participation of single mothers, as their household labor would be 
less likely to be supported by income from other household members, forcing them to work 
no matter the level of child care costs. As expected, the author concludes that elasticities differ 
in size: the child care price elasticity for employment is found to be -0.22 for single mothers 
and -0.92 for married mothers.
52
Studies  have also been conducted outside  the  US with largely similar  results.  Cleveland, 
Gunderson  and  Hyatt  (1996)  have  estimated  the  elasticity  by  using  data  from Canadian 
National Child Care Survey conducted in 1988, finding an elasticity of -0.388. Powell (1997) 
uses  the  same data  set  in  her  study but  supplements  it  the  1988 Labour Market  Activity 
Survey which allows the author to match wage data with child care choice20. Also Powell’s 
estimation shows a statistically significantly negative effect between child care costs and the 
labor force participation, with a very similar elasticity of -0.38. Using Australian data, Doiron 
and Kalb (2004) find the elasticity in hours of work with respect to child care costs to be -0.15 
for single parents, -0.03 for women with partners. Besides being rather small in quantity, it is 
interesting to note that in Australia single parents are more responsive to child care costs than 
partnered people. Finally, Gustafsson and Stafford (1992) have studied the phenomenon in 
Sweden where the quality of child care is relatively constant, as it is mostly provided by the 
state. The net price elasticity for labor supply is around estimated to be -1.88 when there is no 
rationing for child care places and -0.063 for all mothers. 
Whereas the research above was based on probability models, some authors have estimated 
the effect of child care costs on women's labor supply with a structural model. In general, 
these models tend to find much lower child care cost elasticities for employment than the 
models presented above. For example, Michalopoulos, Robins and Garfinkel (1992) use US 
data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation to achieve this purpose. They first 
formulate the mother's maximization problem where mothers seek to maximize such variables 
for example as wages, child care quality and child care cost under US taxation and subsidy 
structures.  As a  result  of  the estimation,  the  authors  find that  the  child  care  subsidy rate 
elasticity for hours worked is 0.00 for both married and single mothers. Using the same data, 
Ribar (1995) finds that the uncompensated paid care cost elasticity for employment ranges 
from -0.024 to -0.088, depending on the model specifications. In a similar manner but using 
French data, Choné, le Blanc and Robert-Bobée (2003) find the child care cost elasticity for 
labor  force  participation  to  be  a  meager  -0.01,  whereas  Wrohlich  (2004)  estimates  the 
corresponding elasticity to be -0.02 in East Germany and -0.03 in West Germany. It is clear 
that the elasticities obtained from the structural models are smaller than those from the probit-
models. Unfortunately, the cause behind these differences remains unclear. It should be noted, 
however, that child care elasticity figures correspond relatively well to wage elasticities. This 
20 Cleveland, Gunderson and Hyatt (1996) estimated wages based on mother’s characteristics such as age and 
education which creates more imprecision to their model. 
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is logical, as only the quantity of net income is important for the participation decision, not 
how it's constituted. Although subsidizing child care cannot harm the narrowing of the gender 
gap in labor force participation, it seems that it is not necessarily an efficient way to pursue 
this goal as the elasticities are relatively close to zero. Thus, changes in child care costs are 
cannot by themselves explain changes and variation in the gender gap in LFPRs.
5.4 Technology
We will  next  move  from policy  instruments  to  discussing  the  constraints  and  incentives 
technology can provide for women's labor supply. We will consider three ways through which 
technological  advances  could  impact  the  female  labor  force  participation  rate.  First,  the 
development of home appliances could increase household productivity which would result in 
fewer hours needed for household work. This would give women more time to work in the 
official labor markets. Second, the introduction of more efficient contraceptive technologies 
could allow women to better control their life-cycle labor supply,  as the risk of unwanted 
pregnancies decreases. Finally, advances in medical sciences could also alleviate the health 
risks associated with giving birth which could result in an increase in labor supply.
The introduction and cheapening of home appliances has had a significant impact on women's 
labor  supply.  If  the  amount  of  household  work  is  assumed  to  be  relatively constant,  the 
increased  productivity  given  by  these  appliances  would  enable  women  to  combine  both 
household work and market  labor  at  the same time (Greenwood, Seshadri  and Yorukoglu 
2005). Technological advances in home appliances might also decrease the gap in household 
productivity between the spouses, lessening the need for specialization and thus increasing 
women's labor force participation (Borjas 2010). By utilizing a Beckerian model of household 
production, Greenwood, Seshadri and Yorukoglu (2005) suggest that slightly over a half of 
the increase in women's labor force participation in the US during the 20th century could be 
explained by technological advances, measured by the price of household appliances, with the 
progress  having  its  biggest  impact  after  the  1950s.  The  authors  attribute  the  rest  of  the 
narrowing to the decline in the gender wage gap. Somewhat similar results have been found 
by Cavalcanti and Tavares (2008) who have studied how the decrease in prices of the home 
appliances has influenced female labor force participation across a group of OECD countries. 
The authors  find in  a  simple  OLS-test  some evidence as  to  there  being some effect:  the 
coefficient of home appliances price index is consistently negative, and remains statistically 
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significant in nine of the ten specifications used21. This is further confirmed by using relative 
manufacturing price index and an index for the terms of trade adjustment as instrumental 
variables. The results  from IV-estimation indicate that the causal relationship between the 
price of home appliances and female labor force participation is actually stronger than in the 
OLS-test. The elasticity of price index for female labor force participation ranges from -0.73 
to -0.46. Overall, the authors estimate that the decrease in the price of home appliances could 
account for 10% to 15% of the total change in female labor force participation from 1975 to 
1999  which  is  relatively  similar  to  the  estimation  done  by  Greenwood,  Seshadri  and 
Yorukoglu  (2005).  One  could  assume  that  the  importance  of  this  particular  form  of 
technological progress has become smaller over time at least in the OECD countries, as most 
of  the  time  gains  have  already  been  realized.  Therefore,  further  development  of  home 
appliances is unlikely to have a major impact in further narrowing the gap.
On a completely other form of technological progress, Goldin and Katz (2002) have studied 
the impact of oral birth control pills on college graduate women's career paths. According to 
the authors, the introduction of the pill, and especially its spread among single women, has 
allowed women to further invest to their human capital, as the risk of unwanted pregnancy has 
greatly diminished.  Therefore,  women have been more  able  to  participate  in  professional 
degree programs, giving them better labor opportunities later on. Thus, the pill could have 
also had an impact on labor supply. At the same time as the introduction of the pill, the age of 
first marriage increased as the risk of pregnancy no longer needed to be insured against. Using 
state level variation in the age of legal consent for acquiring the pill in the 1960s and 1970s, 
Bailey (2006) estimates that access to the pill before the age of 21 increased the labor force 
participation of 26 to 30 year old women by approximately 8 percent. The increase came 
mostly through birth timing: The possibility of delaying childbirth with low costs allowed 
women to  remain  in  school  longer,  thus  allowing  them to  pursue  long-term careers  and 
participate in the labor markets in their 20s. 
On  our  third  topic  on  technology,  Albanesi  and  Olivetti  (2009)  have  studied  how 
technological improvements in maternal health and infant feeding could have contributed to 
the rise in married women's labor force participation in the United States in the 20 th century. 
Maternal health is measured by approximating how many deaths childbearing is likely to have 
21 The coefficient loses its statistical significance only when all control variables are used with country 
dummies, year dummies and country-specific time trends. 
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caused to the population whereas improvements in infant feeding are measured by the time 
price of infant formula. Price of home appliances is also used as an explaining variable, giving 
us further knowledge also on that topic. The authors conclude that improvements in maternal 
health were an important factor in explaining the rise in participation that occurred between 
1920 and 1960: Improvement  in maternal  health could by itself  explain the entire  rise in 
married women's labor force participation until 1955. By contrast,  improvements in infant 
feeding seemed to have their strongest effect on participation when both the number of infants 
is high, and when maternal health is at a sufficiently high level to induce participation in the 
first place. However, its effect is less strong than that of maternal health: The authors estimate 
that improvements in infant feeding adds between 5 to 10 percentage points to participation 
for women at childbearing age between 1940 and 1960, and around 4 percentage points after 
the  1960s.  Finally,  the  authors  conclude  that  home  appliances  have  seemed  to  mostly 
influence participation after 1975 which time-wise contradicts the findings of  Greenwood, 
Seshadri and Yorukoglu (2005). The wider range of variables gives greater credibility to the 
work done by Albanesi and Olivetti (2009).
5.5 Informal Institutions: Identity and Culture
More informal structures, such as norms or identities, can also have a significant influence on 
one's  decision  making,  including  the  decision  on  whether  to  work  in  the  official  labor 
markets.  There  is  a  reciprocal  relationship  between  norms  and  identity:  Prevalent  norms 
constrain the identities of people along proper lines, but on the other hand norms can also be 
seen as  being  constituted  from the  collection  of  identities  within  a  society.  According to 
Goldin (1990),  for  example,  aversion towards  married women to  work was an  important 
factor explaining the low level of female labor force participation in the United States before 
the Second World War. The use of married women to satisfy the demand for labor during the 
war, however, changed existing attitudes and paved way for a higher level of participation 
later on. Therefore, causality can work both ways between values and employment patterns22. 
Despite  its  explanatory potential,  research  concerning the  impact  of  culture  on economic 
variables has been rather scarce in the field of economics, as preferences are usually taken as 
given. One way to approach the issue is to define culture and preferences inherent to it as a 
type of informal institution. For example, North (1992) states that informal rules, consisting 
of codes of conduct, norms of behavior, and conventions are a distinct form of institutions. 
Just  as  formal  institutions  like  laws,  they  can  both  create  incentives  or  constrain  action. 
22 The clear majority of the research, however, concentrates on how values affect participation. As an example 
of the opposite, see Seguino (2007).
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However, there are also some crucial differences between formal and informal institutions. 
Whereas formal institutions can be adjusted relatively easily, the decentralized nature of the 
informal institutions makes them difficult to change as they are often deeply embedded in 
culture, and transferred through teaching and imitation.
Akerlof and Kranton (2000) have sought to incorporate identity more formally into economic 
analysis which could yield at least four potential benefits. First, identity can explain behavior 
that appears otherwise detrimental. This could be used in explaining why some women may 
prefer household work even if it makes their bargaining position worse with respect to their 
market working husbands. Second, identity underlies a new type of externality: For example, 
early working women could face opposition from other women and men as the breaking of 
former gendered boundaries challenged their identities. Third, identity reveals a new way in 
which preferences can be changed. Thus, associating working women with positive values 
could create a new female identity, changing preferences for working in the long run. Fourth, 
as  identity  is  important  for  behavior,  the  choice  of  identity  may  be  the  most  important 
economic  decision  one  makes.  Of  course,  the  choice  of  one's  identity  can  be  strongly 
constrained, as it often is in the case of gender.
In Akerlof  and Kranton's  (2000) identity based model,  utility function is  based  on social 
categories  C.  Each  person  j  has  assigned  themselves  and  every  other  person  to  these 
categories cj. Prescriptions P indicate the appropriate behavior for each of these categories. In 
the case of gender, people are generally categorized either as men or women, with varying 
concepts for appropriate behavioral models. The utility function then becomes:
U j=U ja j , a− j , I j (5.1)
Here, utility depends on one's actions (aj), one's self-image (Ij) and other people's actions (a-j). 
Actions  here  comprise  the  usual  possibilities  considered  in  utility  functions,  such  as 
consumption of goods. The self-image can be presented as:
I j=Ija j , a− j ;c j , j , P (5.2)
Thus, one's identity depends on the social category cj assigned to the actor, how one's personal 
characteristics (εj) fit  that social  category,  indicated by prescriptions P. Furthermore,  one's 
own actions and the actions of others also affect one's  identity.  Following this  definition, 
increases and decreases in utility related to Ij can be called as gains or losses in identity. It 
should be noted that social categories and prescriptions can be changed over time through 
actions, as has somewhat happened concerning the differences between men and women.
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Akerlof and Kranton (2000) also create a prototype model on how economic interaction could 
take place with identity as a factor. In this model, described in figure 8, there are two social 
categories and two possible activities. Every person prefers one of the activities: Undertaking 
the preferred activity gives them utility V whereas undertaking the other activity gives them 
zero utility. Let Person One prefer and choose activity one, and Person Two prefer activity 
two. This gives the second person two options: Choose activity one and receive zero utility, or 
choose activity two and receive a utility V-Is, comprising of the utility gained from activity 
two and a potential loss in identity. If Person Two chooses the latter, this leaves Person One 
two choices: They can either not respond and suffer a utility loss I0, or they can respond at a 
cost c. If Person One responds, this incurs a utility cost of L to Person Two. There are four 
possible equilibria in the model:
1) Person  One  deters  person  two  from  engaging  in  activity  two,  when  c  <  I0 and 
Is < V < Is + L;
2) Person One responds but does not deter Person Two from engaging in activity two, 
when c < I0 and Is + L < V;
3) Person One does not respond and Person Two engages in activity two, when c > I0 and 
Is < V;
4) Person Two engages in activity one regardless of Person One, when Is > V.
Source: Akerlof & Kranton 2000, 729.
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Figure 8: Game Tree of Interaction 
between Person One and Person Two
The identity-based model can be used to explain the observed changes in the gender gap in 
LFPRs. The decrease in the gap could be attributed to changes in attitudes concerning proper 
role for men and women, thus decreasing women's identity gains in homemaking (Akerlof & 
Kranton 2000). Furthermore, the persistence and variation of the gap could be attributed to 
persisting gender attitudes and variation in gender attitudes across countries respectively.
The problem with identity based approach, however, is that it is relatively difficult to confirm 
or falsify as it is difficult to observe and quantify people's identities and relate them to labor 
market behavior. Recently two main empirical methods have been used to look at culture's, 
and thus identity's, influence on labor market performance23: First, one can look at whether 
there  are  differences  in  female  labor  force  participation  between  different  groups  of 
immigrants in a given country. This method works better when focusing on the children of 
immigrants, as they have grown in a similar institutional structure. A second way is to utilize 
value surveys to determine dispositions towards working women at a certain place and time, 
and then see if these values have an effect on the probability of participation.
As an example of the first way, Fernández and Fogli (2009) have studied the differences in the 
gender gap in participation between second generation immigrants in the United States24. By 
having the  data  from a  single  country,  the  authors  can  reasonably argue  that  differences 
between  groups  are  unlikely  to  be  attributed  to  differences  in  labor  market  institutions. 
Furthermore,  a  single-country  study  allows  the  authors  to  better  control  human  capital 
differences.  Cultural values are derived from the labor force participation rates and the total 
fertility rates of countries of ancestry. The results from various models indicate that cultural 
proxies do have an effect on second-generation immigrant women’s employment levels in the 
United States. Notably, the same proxies do not have an impact on men’s employment levels, 
implying  that  women’s  employment  status  is  more  susceptible  to  cultural  practices. 
Interestingly for married women, their husbands' cultural background is more important than 
their  own  in  explaining  their  labor  force  participation.  This  implies  that  men  still  have 
stronger bargaining positions inside the marriage, as their cultural values are more likely to 
affect women's labor market outcomes. Furthermore, the authors find out that the strength of 
23 A third possibility, used for example by Vlasblom and Schippers (2004), is to denote the residual of change in 
female labor market participation to a change in values. Research conducted in this fashion is, however, 
especially susceptible to omitted variables. Therefore, conclusions made from such a piece of research should 
be taken with some skepticism.
24 Similar research has also been done by Antecol (2000), but he mixes immigrants from different generations 
in his study which could technically skew the results. The actual results are, however, largely similar.
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the cultural proxies increases when the ethnic group is clustered to same living areas: The 
higher the average density of living for an ethnic group, the higher the impact of culture on 
women's labor force outcomes. This could be explained by enhanced transmission of values 
through role  models,  or  by greater  capacity  for  applying  incentives  and  punishments  for 
behavior.
As noted above, one can also utilize value surveys to determine the effect of values on labor 
force participation. When using such a strategy one should, however, bear in mind that the 
institutional structure also differs to some extent across countries. Omitted variable bias could 
thus  become  a  significant  problem here.  Fortin  (2005)  has  used  data  from World  Value 
Surveys  to  study  how  attitudes  concerning  gender  and  market  labor  affect  women's 
employment and wages. On an individual level, preferring men to have access to work over 
women  when  jobs  are  scarce  is  found  to  have  a  statistically  significant  and  negative 
correlation coefficient in the case of female employment with no significant correlation with 
male employment. Furthermore, attitudes concerning working mothers and working at home 
are also weakly correlated with women’s employment levels so that when household work is 
seen as suitable for women, their labor force participation is likely to be lower. None of the 
aforementioned  proxies  are  statistically  significantly  correlated  with  men’s  employment 
levels, implying that male employment levels are more related to features of the labor markets 
such as unemployment levels. The impact of values also persists  when the comparison is 
made between countries. One additional note of interest is that the inclusion of proxies for 
values cuts the impact of public expenditure to child care to half. This implies overestimation 
of the impact of policy variables in research when differences in values are unaccounted for. 
By using a similar method, corresponding results have also been found by Algan and Cahuc 
(2005) and Contreras and Plaza (2010).
Besides  studying  the  impact  of  society-wide  values  on  women's  employment,  it  is  also 
possible to look more closely how these values are relayed. Fernández, Fogli and Olivetti 
(2004)  conclude  that  the  probability  of  a  man  having  a  working  wife  is  statistically 
significantly  correlated  with  his  mother's  working  behavior  when  numerous  background 
variables,  such as region and education,  are  controlled.  It  is  estimated that  an exogenous 
increase of labor supply by one week for women of childbearing age increases the labor 
supply of  the  subsequent  generation  by approximately 1.67  weeks.  This  gives  proof  that 
preferences concerning gender are, at least to some extent, formed during childhood, implying 
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that large scale changes in values are likely to take some time. Both the constant decrease and 
the  persistence  of  the  gender  gap  in  participation  are  thus  largely  consistent  with  this 
explanations based on culture.
6 Empirical Analysis: Variation in Gender Gap in Europe 1994-2006
The purpose  of  the  empirical  analysis  is  to  assess  how policy instruments,  labor  market 
institutions and demographic variables affect the gender gap in labor force participation rate 
across countries and time. Due to the availability of data, the empirical analysis concentrates 
on a group of European countries and thus somewhat resembles the aforementioned cross-
country study conducted by Jaumotte (2003). There are, however,  at least three factors which 
differentiate  this  study.  First,  the time period of  the study is  different:  Whereas  Jaumotte 
studied the evolution of women's LFPR from 1985 to 1999, this study comprises more recent 
data, from 1994 to 2006. Secondly, the group of countries is slightly different: This study 
contains a number of Eastern European countries within the data,  but lacks the few non-
European countries present in Jaumotte's study. Third, whereas Jaumotte explicitly looks at 
female  participation  levels,  we  are  more  interested  in  the  gender  gap  in  participation. 
Although most of the variation in the gender gap in participation is likely to be caused by 
changes in women's participation, it is also possible that some of the independent variables 
considered here could affect participation of both genders in the same direction,  but with 
differing  strength.  If  a  policy  measure  increased  the  participation  rate  for  both  men  and 
women but had a stronger effect on the former, this should be interpreted as being adverse for 
gender equality although women's participation would also increase. Finally, there are also 
some differences in methodology, the most notable being that, besides heteroskedasticity, this 
piece of research also takes the potential autocorrelation into account.
The rest of the chapter will progress as follows. First, data and the set of variables to be used 
will be presented. Based on former studies, some initial comments concerning the expected 
effect of the variables will be made. Methodology of the study will follow consequently, with 
specific importance paid to the potential problems of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. 
Limitations of the data will also be discussed here as far as it impacts the choice of the proper  
estimation  method.  After  this,  estimation  results  will  be  presented,  to  be  subsequently 
followed by a more thorough discussion.
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6.1 Data and Variables
The data set consists of data from 20 European countries: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, 
Denmark,  Finland,  France,  Germany,  Greece,  Hungary,  Ireland,  Italy,  Luxembourg,  the 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. 
Data is in annual form, and comprises the years from 1994 to 2006. The data is in aggregated 
at the country level, so it is not as accurate as micro data would be. However, the data should 
be sufficient in highlighting how the gender gap in LFPRs can vary at the country level. As 
most of the data  has been collected by the same source,  OECD, it  is  unlikely to contain 
significant  discrepancies.  Furthermore,  data  concerning a  given variable  is  always from a 
single source which enhances comparability. Linear interpolation is used to estimate missing 
values.
Gender gap in labor force participation rate will serve as the dependent variable in most of 
the  estimations.  As  labor  force  participation  rate  describes  the  ratio  of  employed  and 
unemployed of working age people to the whole working age population, gender gap in it is 
the simple extraction of the female LFPR from the male LFPR. In this  instance,  we will 
mainly utilize the gender gap in labor force participation rate for 25-to-54-year-old people: 
This age group is most likely to participate in labor markets, as studying and retirement are 
probably only a minor issue for this age group. In the course of the analysis we will also 
shortly look whether the results are similar for different age groups. Finally, data for male and 
female LFPRs will be used to assess their respective importance in defining the gap. Source: 
OECD (2010/I).
Figure 9 shows the gender gap in LFPRs from 1994 to 2006. The gap has narrowed in most of 
the countries during the ten-year-period: only countries with relatively low initial gaps have in 
some cases experienced widening. In 1994 the average difference in labor force participation 
rates between the two genders was around 21.6 percentage points, but in 2006 the gap had 
narrowed down to 14.3 percentage  points,  meaning that  around one third of  the  gap has 
disappeared in just over ten years. The gender gap is largest in Mediterranean countries such 
as Greece,  Italy and Spain,  whereas it  is  lowest in  Nordic countries such as Finland and 
Sweden.
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Source: OECD 2010/I.
Income tax variable describes how the income tax of a person changes depending on their 
family status. It is formulated by extracting the average income tax percentage of a single 
person with no children at 100% of average earnings by the income tax percentage of one 
earner married couple with two children at 100% of average earnings. The idea behind this 
variable is in providing a measure for the tax system in a country. As we have seen this can a 
significant impact on the work incentives for married women. Potential problems with the 
variable are that it inseparably captures the effects of both marriage (system of  taxation) and 
children (child deductions) on income tax percentage.  Furthermore,  the measure might be 
somewhat misleading if the bulk of taxation is done with different forms of taxation. Source: 
OECD (2010/I).
Values is an indexed constructed from a question in the World Values Survey and is used to 
assess the extent to which the two genders are seen to have different roles in the economy. 
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Figure 9: Evolution of Gender Gap in LFPRs in Selected Countries, 1994-2006
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The question more specifically asks,  whether men would have more right to employment 
when jobs are scarce. The question has four possible answers (strongly agree; agree; disagree; 
strongly disagree),  and these have been coded by the author to  the values 4,  3,  2,  and 1 
respectively. By multiplying these with the proportion of people giving a certain answer at a 
given time  and place,  we can  construct  a  rough index  concerning the  values  concerning 
gender roles in the labor markets. We assume that high values of this index are more likely to 
be associated with a high gender gap in LFPRs. Source: World Values Survey Association 
(2009).
Human capital  differences  will  be  assessed  with  gender gap in  average  years  spent  at 
school for population of 25 years and over, as most of the schooling should be done by this 
age.  Following human capital  theory of  gender  differences,  gender  gap in  human capital 
implies also a gap in labor force participation. Data is available on gap in primary, secondary 
and tertiary schooling, as well as on total years of schooling, but initial testing suggests that 
the gap in average years of primary schooling can best explain variation in the gender gap in 
participation25. Data is based on the data collected by Barro and Lee (2010), who estimate the 
overall and female average school years in much of the world with five-year-intervals until 
2010. For this paper, data from years between 1995 and 2010 has been used and values within 
the intervals have been interpolated linearly. Source: Barro and Lee (2010).
Unemployment rate gives the unemployment rate of all persons between 15 and 64. A high 
unemployment rate could result in fewer opportunities for women (and for men) in the labor 
markets. This could have implications for the gender gap in LFPRs, if women were more 
likely than men to move outside the labor markets when job opportunities become scarce. A 
wide age group is chosen for this variable in order to reduce the risk of endogeneity between 
this variable and the gender gap in LFPRs. Source: OECD (2010/I).
Part-time employment gives us the ratio of part-time workers of all the workers in a given 
country  at  a  given  time.  Our  hypothesis  is  that  a  prevalence  of  part-time  employment 
opportunities, signified by a high part-time employment ratio, would benefit women as this 
25 For details, see table 7 in Appendix II. The results indicate that gender gap in primary schooling is the only 
variable to have a statistically significant impact on the gender gap in LFPRs, while also yielding the highest 
coefficient of determination. It is interesting to note that the lack of variable for the gender gap in primary 
schooling increases the relevance of both unemployment rate and average job tenure in determining the 
gender gap. This implies that women with little education are likely to be more susceptible for disturbances 
in the labor markets.
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would give them a better opportunity of combining work and childrearing when their children 
are young. This would result in a narrower gender gap in LFPRs. Jaumotte (2003) notes that 
as the choice for part- or full-time employment can be partly simultaneous with the choice of 
participation which could create bias for the estimated coefficients. The use of the ratio of 
part-time for all workers as opposed to those between 25 and 54 years old should alleviate this 
problem to some extent. Source: OECD (2010/I).
Average job tenure describes the average length of job tenures for all employees within a 
country at a specific period of time. The purpose of the variable is to provide information on 
the type of skills that are used.  A large value for the variable implies that the country is  
intensive in firm-specific skills, whereas a small value implies reliance on a more general set 
of skills. A country intensive with general skills would more likely have a narrower gender 
gap, as interruptions in the working life would not overly inhibit re-entrance to labor markets. 
Source: OECD (2010/I).
Employment protection ratio measures  the  procedures  and costs  involved in  dismissing 
workers and the procedures involved in hiring workers. The idea of the variable is to look at 
how flexible the labor markets are, however, its impact is not altogether clear a priori. On the 
one hand easier dismissals could result in pregnant women being laid off, but on the other 
hand easier hiring could ease their re-entrance to the labor markets. It is also possible that a 
high level of employment protection would deter employers from hiring young women, as 
they would be forced to hold onto them in case of pregnancy. Thus, employment protection 
ratio could be used to assess the level of discrimination in the labor markets. Source: OECD 
(2010/I).
Total fertility rate gives the amount of births per woman for the whole population.  It  is 
assumed that a high value for the total fertility rate would result in a high gender gap in  
LFPRs, as women would spend more time outside the workforce due to childbearing and 
childrearing. This effect, however, might not materialize as recent research has shown this 
relationship to have become weaker. It should be noted that the mean age of women at the 
birth of first child was slightly under 28 in OECD countries in 2008. Source: OECD (2010/II).
Maternal and parental leave gives the amount of public and mandatory private money spent 
on maternal  and parental  leaves as a  percentage of the GDP.  This  includes  spending on 
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maternity  grants,  maternity  and  parent's  allowances,  and  parental  leave  benefits.  We  are 
assuming here that women are far more likely than men in taking advantage of the parental 
leave opportunities. On the one hand, a high spending on parental leaves could help mothers 
in keeping their permanent jobs before and after giving birth, therefore resulting in a lower 
value for the gender gap. On the other hand, generous policies could also slow the return to 
wage labor after giving birth. Source: OECD (2010/I).
Day care variable gives the amount of public and mandatory private money spent on child 
day care and home help services as a percentage of the GDP. High spending could allow 
women to return to work after giving birth as they would have support in organizing someone 
to take care of their children. Source: OECD (2010/I).
Marriage  rate gives  us  the  number  of  marriages  per  1000 people  occurring  in  a  given 
country in a given year. A high number of marriages is likely to widen the gender gap, as 
married women are less likely to work in the labor markets. Source: Eurostat (2010).
Divorce rate gives us the number of divorces per 1000 people at a specific country and year. 
With respect to the gender gap in participation, it should work at the opposite direction than 
the crude marriage rate, as a high number of divorces should increase the amount of non-
married women in the economy. Source: Eurostat (2010).
Gender pay gap is given as difference between average gross hourly earnings of male paid 
employees and of female paid employees as a percentage of average gross earnings of male 
paid  employees.  The  data  used  here  has  been  collected  by  national  sources,  and  is  not 
therefore completely comparable.  Micro-level theory suggests that a wide pay gap should 
result in a wide participation gap, as the participation wage elasticity should not be negative 
under any circumstances. As discussed before, however, it is possible that this relationship 
does not hold at the country level as women with implied lower wages may decide to stay 
outside the labor  markets altogether.  We may therefore observe a situation where a  wide 
gender pay gap will be connected with a narrow gap in participation. Source: Eurostat (2010).
Table 3 collects some descriptive statistics concerning the variables. First we note that, not 
surprisingly, men's labor force participation rate is on average higher than that of women's. 
Actually, the average participation rate for men is higher than the maximum participation rate 
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for women in any of the countries at any point of time. In addition, by comparing the standard 
deviations of the two figures we can see that women's participation rate tends to vary a lot 
more across countries and time. We should also note that the variables for the ratio for part-
time employment and for the gender pay gap vary considerably.
The rough connections between individual variables can be studied by looking at correlation 
coefficients which are displayed in the table 8 in Appendix II. First point of interest is that the 
labor force participation rates of men and women are almost uncorrelated. When looking at 
the correlations between these two variables and the gender gap, we can see that women's 
labor  force  participation  rate  is  very strongly correlated  (coefficient  -0.96)  with  the  gap, 
whereas the correlation coefficient between the gap and men's LFPR is not nearly as large 
(coefficient 0.25). This implies that variation in women's participation levels is the main force 
behind variation in the gap. Furthermore,  all  but one of the chosen independent variables 
show at  least  some statistically significant  correlation with the variable  of  gender  gap in 
LFPRs, justifying their selection.
Finally,  it  should  be noted  that  some of  the  correlation  coefficients  between independent 
variables are fairly large. For example, the coefficient between the variable for day care and 
the variable for values is -0.64, and between employment protection ratio and gender gap in 
primary schooling 0.57. This could potentially lead to the problem of multicollinearity where 
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Table 3: Variable Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Gender gap LFPR 25-54 18.10 9.14 4.37 41.16
LFPR men 25-54 92.22 2.51 82.95 98.26
LFPR women 25-54 74.12 8.84 52.57 87.18
Income tax 5.57 4.94 0.00 21.27
Values 1.54 0.22 1.08 2.11
Gender gap in primary schooling 0.12 0.19 -0.19 0.74
Gender gap in secondary schooling 0.44 0.47 -0.18 1.86
Gender gap in tertiary schooling 0.12 0.14 -0.24 0.53
Gender gap in total schooling 0.68 0.62 -0.41 2.16
Unemployment rate 7.65 3.66 1.90 20.00
Part-time employment 14.35 7.10 2.52 35.57
Average job tenure 10.11 1.14 7.76 12.08
Employment protection ratio 2.21 0.84 0.60 3.85
Total fertility rate 1.55 0.23 1.13 1.98
Maternal and parental leave 0.33 0.25 0.00 1.23
Day care 0.62 0.47 0.00 2.02
Marriage rate 5.06 0.65 3.57 7.19
Divorce rate 2.04 0.76 0.00 3.80
Gender pay gap 0.84 0.05 0.72 0.95
the confidence intervals for the coefficients would be overly wide. Thus, the rejection of the 
null hypotheses would become more difficult than it should be, although the estimates would 
remain unbiased. Multicollinearity among independent variables can be checked by looking at 
the so-called Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) which is defined as follows (e.g. O'Brien 2007):
VIF= 1
1−R i
2 ,  where R i
2 represents  the  proportion  of  variance  in  the  ith  independent 
variable that is associated with the other independent variables in the model. More formally it  
is the coefficient of determination of regression for the variable i on all the other independent 
variables. The term 1−Ri
2 is usually referred as tolerance. The VIFs and tolerances for the 
main independent variables are collected in table 4 below:
According to O'Brien (2007) the most commonly used threshold for the value for VIF in the 
presence of multicollinearity is around 10, although even levels of this magnitude are not 
necessarily detrimental for the regression results. As the values for all VIFs are comfortably 
under this threshold, we conclude that multicollinearity should not be a problem in our case.
6.2 Methodology
In the estimation equation we will seek to explain changes in the gender gap in labor force 
participation rates by changes in other variables. We will assume a model with country fixed 
effects which should capture most of the impact of country-specific variables which might 
have been omitted from the specification. It is unlikely, for example, that the variables used in 
the  specification  could  capture  all  the  informal  institutions  affecting  gender  in  the  labor 
markets. Thus, we will be estimating an equation of the form:
y it=i ' x itit  (6.1), where yit is the value of the dependent variable at country i at time t,
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Table 4: Variable Inflation Factors and Tolerances
Variable VIF Tolerance
Income tax 1.18 0.8492
Values 2.37 0.4212
Gender gap in primary schooling 3.97 0.2517
Unemployment rate 1.62 0.6165
Part-time employment 2.69 0.3723
Average job tenure 2.62 0.3812
Employment protection ratio 2.39 0.4176
Total fertility rate 2.15 0.4653
Maternal and parental leave 3.21 0.3117
Day care 3.19 0.3138
Marriage rate 1.83 0.5465
Divorce rate 2.09 0.4790
Gender pay gap 2.16 0.4633
αi is the country-specific coefficient, β is the vector of coefficient estimates, xit is the vector of 
independent variables at country i at time t, and εit is the error term.
 
The data in use for this research can be best described as a longitudinal cross-section data, as 
it consists of country-level aggregated observations from a number of countries over several 
time  periods.  This  type  of  data  is  susceptible  for  at  least  two  technical  issues  which 
discourage us from relying on a simple OLS-regression in our analysis. First, as the data is  
cross-sectional, it is possible that the variances of the random variables are different across 
different  countries  as  the  populations  of  the  countries  differ,  i.e.,  the  data  suffers  from 
heteroskedasticity. Or more formally (e.g. Angrist & Pischke 2009; Verbeek 2004):
Var i= i
2 for i = 1,. . . ., n. (6.2)26
To test for panel-level heteroskedasticity in data, we can utilize a generalized least squares 
likelihood-ratio test by comparing the fit of a model with heteroskedasticity-corrected weights 
with a model without them. The likelihood-ratio test statistic is given as (Verbeek 2004):
LR=2 log L −log L    (6.3), where  θ is the likelihood parameter vector. Running the 
test will gives us the following result: 
 LR χ
2(19)=279.54
Prob>χ2<0.0001
As the zero-hypothesis is rejected, the data set is deemed to suffer from heteroskedasticity.
There are at  least two major ways of taking care of heteroskedasticity.  First,  one can use 
variance-adjusted weights to correct for the heteroskedasticity. Second, one can use specific 
heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors when assessing the statistical significance of the 
estimation. According to Angrist and Pischke (2009), the former method could be somewhat 
problematic as the variance of the error terms is unknown. As estimating a wrong model for 
the heteroskedasticity would lead to wrongly chosen weights, the weighted regression could 
end up having worse finite-sample properties than unweighted estimates. In addition, using 
the weighted least squares could give us less information in case of non-linearity.
The second problem is related to the time-path of the dependent variable, the gender gap in 
labor force participation rate. As for example Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan (2004) point 
26 Compare with homoskedastic standard errors: Var i=
2 for i = 1,. . . ., n.
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out, many variables concerning labor markets, such as employment or wages, are typically 
highly autocorrelated. This means that a country-and-time-specific error term is in some way 
correlated to its predecessors. As all the unobserved variables crowd into the error term, their 
impact can create autoregressive tendencies in an OLS-model. Obviously, this is a concern 
also  for  this  piece  of  research.  This  problem  can  be  alleviated  by  estimating  the 
autocorrelation structure from the data. Unfortunately, without a sufficiently large number of 
data points the estimation of the autocorrelation structure can be problematic as the OLS- 
estimation of the AR(1) structure is biased downwards with few data points. This can result in 
over-rejection of  the null hypothesis of no effect, i.e., independent variables would be more 
likely to show a statistically significant effect on the dependent variable.
Autocorrelation within panels can be tested by using a test developed by Wooldridge (2002) 
and also reported by Dukker (2003). The idea of the test is to obtain the residuals from the 
regression estimation and then compare their values. If the specific residuals of each panel εit 
were  not  serially  correlated,  then  we  should  have  Corr(Δεit,  Δεit.1)  =  -.5.Given  this,  the 
procedure regresses the residuals from the regression with first-differenced variables on their 
lags and tests that the coefficient on the lagged residuals is equal to -.5.  The test gives us the 
following result where the zero-hypothesis is rejected, implying autocorrelation within panels:
F(1,19)=73.870
Prob>F<0.0001  
Autocorrelation across panels is also a possibility in a setting of longitudinal panel-data, but is 
rather unlikely when considering the purpose of this particular piece of research. Even though 
labor force participation levels across countries could be correlated over time27, a cross-panel 
autocorrelation in this case would require that changes in the business cycles would affect 
genders similarly in all the countries. As this would require the rather unlikely scenario of a 
similar  industrial  structure  with  respect  to  gender  across  countries,  we  will  assume 
autocorrelation across panels to be non-existent.
There  are  a  number  of  methods  that  can  be  used  to  correct  for  heteroskedasticity  and 
autocorrelation  in  longitudinal  panel  data  sets.  However,  these  methods  could  run  into 
problems with dealing relatively small  data  sets,  and it  is  not altogether  clear  which one 
should  be  used  (Angrist  & Pischke  2009).  Therefore,  we  will  run  the  model  with  three 
27 This could take place if the countries are strongly linked by mutual trade which could cause the business 
cycles to become synchronized.
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separate models which should give us a reasonably good idea for the robustness of the results. 
OLS-estimation  will  also  be  offered  as  a  reference  point  but  it  is  likely  to  give  overly 
optimistic  results  concerning  the  effect  of  the  dependent  variables  on  the  independent 
variable. Of the used models accounting for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, the first 
two do this by adjusting standard errors while the correlation coefficients remain the same as 
in the OLS-estimation. These two models tend to work best with a large number of clusters. 
The  third  model  utilized  here  will  assume  a  certain  structure  for  the  process  of 
autocorrelation. Thus, this model will give us coefficients different from those received from 
simple OLS-estimation. In contrast for the other two models, this type of estimation needs a 
large  number  of  time  periods  in  order  to  be  able  estimate  the  autocorrelation  procedure 
correctly. 
As the first of these models, we will use regression where robust standard errors are further 
adjusted  for  country  clusters,  which  should  take  care  of  the  autocorrelation  problem by 
assuming that with a sufficiently large number of clusters, cluster-specific shocks will average 
to zero. Following Rogers (1993), let there be p parameters and n observations. Let X be the 
nxp design matrix and y be the nx1 vector of dependent variable values. The ordinary linear 
regression is then:
X ' X−1 X ' y it (6.4)
The variance of this estimate will then be:
var b=E X ' X−1 X 'y it−Eyiy it−Ey i ' X X ' X 
−1 (6.5)
With i depicting country cluster and t time. With no autocorrelation or heteroskedasticity, all 
of the diagonal terms of the matrix X will be assumed to be identical, and all of the off-
diagonal terms to be zero. In the presence of heteroskedasticity, the diagonal terms are not 
assumed to be identical, and the off-diagonal terms will be assumed to be zero only when the 
observations are from different clusters. Then, all the non-zero elements of the matrix will be 
represented by the appropriate products of the residuals, giving us better estimates for the 
standards errors.
A second way to estimate the standard errors for longitudinal panel data has been proposed by 
Newey and West (1987), as reported by Greene (1993). Now the variance-covariance-matrix 
can be estimated by:
 1
n
S= 1
n
S0
1
n∑l=1
L
w l ∑
i=l1
n
e i e i−lz i z i
'z i−l z i
' = 1
n∑l=0
L
w l Sl (6.6), where
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w l =1− l
L1 (6.7).
where L is the maximum lag length. Compared to the method of proposed by Rogers, Newey-
West estimation gives us slightly different estimate of the autocorrelation structure, as it is 
calculated only based a specified number of former error terms. This is manifested in the 
choice of maximum number of lags (l) used. As it is likely that the gender gap in LFPRs 
would be a moving average process, a small number of lags is likely to be appropriate. Thus, 
a maximum lag of 2 will be used in the main estimation28.
The third way is to estimate an autocorrelation process which will enable us to dissect the part 
of autocorrelation in the residuals.  For a small  sample,  Prais-Winsten estimation using an 
AR(1) autocorrelation process is seen to be a relatively good estimator (e.g. Beck and Katz 
1995; Greene 1993), and is thus used here. This estimation technique will transform the data 
so that both autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity are accounted for. Assume a model for the 
error terms so that (Greene 1993):
it=i it−1u it (6.8), and
Var it = i
2=
 ui
2
1−i
2 (6.9).
For a FGLS estimation of the model, and supposing that r i is a consistent estimate of the ρi, 
we can then transform each time series of dependent variable (yi) (as well as the independent 
variables) using Prais-Winsten transformation. For the first time period, the transmorfation is 
of the form:
yi1=1−r i2 y i1 (6.10)
For the rest of the time periods, the transformations are of the form:
y' i=y iT−r i yiT−1 (6.11)
Giving us a model which is only heteroskedastic. This can then be corrected by weighting the 
variables by the estimate of the variance of the error terms, which is:
 i
2 =
 ui
2
1−r i
2 (6.12), where 
 ui
2 =
e ' i 'e ' i
T
(6.13).
28 Lags from one to four were initially tested, and the results were very stable with respect to the lag length.
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6.3 Estimation results
It should be first noted that in the initial estimation, gender pay gap gave consistently results  
in which a high wage gap implied a low participation gap. As this is likely to be due to 
selection issues and not proper causation, the variable for the wage gap was removed from the 
specifications.  Estimation results  with the remaining variables are collected to the table 5 
below. We can immediately see that the different models give somewhat similar results. Of 
special  importance  is  the  fact  that  the  signs  of  the  correlation  coefficients  are  the  same 
between Prais-Winsten estimation on the one hand, and the rest of the models on the other. 
This should alleviate our fears of operating with a slightly constrained data set. Furthermore, 
the signs of the coefficients are largely as expected which will be discussed further in the next 
sub-chapter.
Of the twelve independent variables used in this specification, five are statistically significant 
at  least  at  the 10% level in all  of the models. These variables are gender gap in primary 
schooling, proportion of part-time employment, spending on day care, crude marriage rate and 
crude divorce rate. In addition, the variable for the ratio of average job tenure is statistically 
significant  in  all  but  one  of  the  models.  Of further  interest  is  the  fact  that  the  variables  
describing  the  system  of  income  taxation  and  parental  leave  policies  are  statistically 
insignificant in all of the formulations. Of the four models, adjusting robust standard errors 
for  country-clusters  seems  to  be   most  conservative  in  accepting  the  impact  of  a  given 
independent variable. The coefficient of determination for the first three models is a relatively 
high figure of 0.71,  when looking at  how well  the models can explain correlation within 
countries29. Thus, the estimation is able to explain 70% of the variation in the gender gap in 
LFPRs. It is also noteworthy that the coefficients in the Prais-Winsten estimation considerably 
more often statistically significant  than in  the other  two main models.  As was mentioned 
earlier, this was a problem related to using AR(1) correction for autocorrelation with short 
time periods. Thus, the models which only adjust standard errors are likely to be more reliable 
in this case.
29 The overall coefficients of determination are close to one, as country fixed effects largely take the variation 
between countries into account.
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To understand better how different variables could have an effect on labor force participation, 
we also ran the estimation with the labor force participation rate of the each gender as the 
dependent variable. The results for these two estimations can be seen in tables 9 and 10 in  
Appendix II. Only few of the variables have a statistically significant impact on men's labor 
force participation and actually none of the variables are statistically significant at the 1% 
level. R2 is also rather low. The proportion of part-time employment is the only variable to be 
statistically significant  in  all  of the specifications,  as  it  increases  men's  participation rate. 
Furthermore, the variables for the average job tenure and for the divorce rate are statistically 
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Table 5: Explaining Gender Gap in LFPRs
OLS regression
p-value p-value p-value p-value
Income tax
0.0772 0.401 0.0772 0.556 0.0772 0.453 0.0035 0.958
[0.0917] [0.1287] [0.1028] [0.0675]
Values
2.1712 0.254 2.1712 0.306 2.1712 0.198 3.4247** 0.010
[1.8995] [2.0620] [1.6826] [1.3266]
22.6888*** p<0.001 22.6888** 0.027 22.6888*** 0.001 20.7939*** p<0.001
[3.4226] [9.4621] [6.5501] [4.3790]
0.2462*** 0.004 0.2462 0.128 0.2462** 0.026 0.0887 0.218
[0.0838] [0.1549] [0.1100] [0.0720]
-0.6711*** p<0.001 -0.6711** 0.019 -0.6711*** p<0.001 -0.5158*** p<0.001
[0.1090] [0.2624] [0.1629] [0.0957]
-1.3714*** 0.003 -1.3714 0.148 -1.3714** 0.024 -0.5858* 0.063
[0.4514] [0.9100] [0.6051] [0.3147]
0.5807 0.310 0.5807 0.502 0.5807 0.303 1.1613*** p<0.001
[0.5707] [0.8483] [0.5627] [0.3207]
Total fertility rate
-3.6968** 0.080 -3.6969 0.247 -3.6969 0.103 -6.2734*** p<0.001
[2.1039] [3.0956] [2.2585] [1.5191]
1.7111 0.308 1.7111 0.531 1.7111 0.367 1.7672 0.151
[1.6760] [2.6816] [1.8935] [1.2302]
Day care
-2.1181** 0.029 -2.1181* 0.093 -2.1181** 0.015 -2.6988*** p<0.001
[0.9623] [1.1994] [0.8640] [0.5632]
Marriage rate
1.1893*** 0.003 1.1893* 0.094 1.1893** 0.011 0.9742*** p<0.001
[0.4004] [0.6739] [0.4636] [0.2642]
Divorce rate
-2.7369*** p<0.001 -2.7369*** 0.002 -2.7369*** p<0.001 -1.3889*** 0.001
[0.5393] [0.7702] [0.7563] [0.4160]
0.7123 0.7123 0.7123
Statistical significance: *** 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level
Standard errors in brackets below the corresponding correlation coefficients
Dependent variable: Gender gap in LFPRs for the age group of 25-54
Linear regression, robust 
standard errors adjusted 
for country-clusters
Linear regression with 
Newey-West standard 
errors
Prais-Winsten 
regression, robust 
standard errors, panel-
specific AR(1) 
autocorrelation
Coefficient 
estimate
Coefficient 
estimate
Coefficient 
estimate
Coefficient 
estimate
Gender gap in 
primary schooling
Unemployment 
rate
Part time 
employment
Average job 
tenure
Employment 
protection ratio
Maternal and 
parental leave
R2
significant  in  three  of  the  models  each:  Long  average  job  tenure  and high  divorce  rates 
decrease men's participation.
The set of independent variables seem to be more relevant in explaining women's labor force 
participation: The coefficient of determination is quite high with 0.68.  The gender gap in 
primary  schooling,  the  availability  of  part  time  employment  and  the  divorce  rate  are 
statistically  significantly  in  all  of  the  specifications.  As  expected,  a  low  gender  gap  in 
schooling also implies a low gap in participation.  The effect of part-time employment on 
participation is in a similar direction for women as it was for men, but with larger coefficients. 
In contrast to men a higher divorce rate increases female participation, implying that being 
married  still  hinders  women's  employment.  There is  also some grounds to  argue that  the 
variables  for  total  fertility  rate,  spending  on  day  care  and  marriage  rate  also  influence 
women's  participation:  They hold  consistent  correlation  coefficients,  they  are  statistically 
significant  in  three  of  the  four  models,  and the  p-value  for  the  remaining model  is  also 
somewhat  low.  As with  gender  gap in  participation,  the  model  where  standard errors  are 
adjusted for country-clusters is clearly the most conservative of the models used.
We also checked whether the results would be largely the same for different age groups. These 
results  should,  however,  be taken more as indicative than definitive,  because due to  data 
limitations independent variables cannot be differentiated for different cohorts. To keep the 
number of tables at a manageable level, these estimations were based solely on the model 
where standard errors were adjusted for country clusters. The choice was based on this being 
the most conservative model which allows us to minimize the risk of type I error. Results 
from these estimations can be found in the table 6 below. We can first see that the divorce rate 
is the sole variable to be statistically significant for all three age groups, with the strongest 
coefficient  for the oldest  age group.  In addition to this,  gender  gap in  primary schooling 
statistically significant for the age groups of 25-to-34-year-olds and 45-to-54-year-olds, and 
fairly close to being statistically significant for the remaining age group. It thus seems that 
this could be considered as another variable that influences women's labor force participation 
across age groups. As with divorce rate, the correlation coefficient is largest for the oldest age 
group. The variable concerning men's right to work shows somewhat similar pattern, with 
clearly the strongest impact for the oldest age group. The importance of the availability for 
part-time employment seems to increase with age. The importance of social factors for the 
gender  gap  of  over  45-year-olds  is  further  emphasized  by  the  variable  depicting  crude 
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marriage rate, which is statistically significant only for this group. Finally, day care seems to 
impact gender gap only with the age group of 35-to-44-year-olds.
6.4 Discussion
We  will  next  discuss  the  results  variable-by-variable  and  contrast  them  to  our  initial 
hypotheses. Overall, the results obtained from the estimations are mostly consistent with the 
results from other research. As was mentioned in the beginning of the previous chapter, a 
wide gender pay gap is associated with a low gender gap in labor force participation. This 
result  should  not,  however,  be  seen  as  implying  a  causal  relationship  between  the  two 
concepts.  Instead,  it  is  likely that  only highly productive  women participate  in  the  labor 
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Table 6: Explaining Gender Gap in LFPRs for Different Age Groups
p-value p-value p-value
Income tax
0.0957 0.498 0.0019 0.991 0.1298 0.370
[0.1384] [0.1681] [0.1412]
Values
4.3964* 0.079 -2.7071 0.387 8.6489*** 0.001
[2.3684] [3.0563] [2.3312]
22.032** 0.040 18.4446 0.109 27.6849*** 0.003
[9.9728] [10.9774] [8.0448]
0.1806 0.194 0.2376 0.242 0.2641 0.170
[0.1341] [0.1966] [0.1851]
-0.3084 0.195 -0.7527** 0.020 -1.0558*** 0.006
[0.2298] [0.2966] [0.3378]
-1.5291 0.128 -1.5092 0.157 -1.2595 0.240
[0.9617] [1.0232] [1.0385]
0.2351 0.823 1.0571 0.317 0.3702 0.732
[1.0363] [1.0291] [1.0650]
Total fertility rate
-0.2008 0.942 -4.4497 0.205 -8.0238* 0.083
[2.7389] [3.3933] [4.3789]
-0.1911 0.930 2.9312 0.468 2.5278 0.526
[2.1469] [3.9542] [3.9163]
Day care
-1.7061 0.202 -2.727* 0.090 -2.0723 0.222
[1.2900] [1.5252] [1.6412]
Marriage rate
0.8193 0.205 1.2461 0.106 1.8394* 0.054
[0.6242] [0.7341] [0.8936]
Divorce rate
-2.2846*** 0.005 -2.5412*** 0.009 -3.9870*** 0.001
[0.7132] [0.8758] [1.0603]
0.5778 0.6497 0.7607
Statistical significance: *** 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level
Standard errors in brackets below the corresponding correlation coefficients
Dependent variable: Gender gap in LFPRs for different age groups
Linear regression, robust 
standard errors adjusted 
for country-clusters (age 
group 25-34)
Linear regression, robust 
standard errors adjusted 
for country-clusters (age 
group 35-44)
Linear regression, robust 
standard errors adjusted 
for country-clusters (age 
group 45-54)
Coefficient 
estimate
Coefficient 
estimate
Coefficient 
estimate
Gender gap in 
primary schooling
Unemployment 
rate
Part time 
employment
Average job 
tenure
Employment 
protection ratio
Maternal and 
parental leave
R2
markets in countries with wide gender gaps in participation. When women with relatively low 
productivities  stay  outside  the  labor  market  altogether  whereas  men  with  similarly  low 
productivities enter the market, it is likely to drive the gender pay gap down. This idea is  
supported  by  the  fact  that  a  wider  gender  wage  gap  increased  the  participation  of  both 
genders, but with much larger coefficient for women. These results are consistent with the 
findings of Olivetti and Petrongolo (2008) and Hunt (1997).
Differing from Jaumotte (2003) as well as other research concerning taxation, we find no 
effect on participation from the income tax wedge in any of the estimations. It should be 
noted, however, that the correlation coefficients are of the expected sign in all of the models: 
A high tax wedge increases men's and decreases women's participation, thus increasing the 
gender  gap,  but  with  statistical  insignificance  in  all  cases.  A better  specification  for  the 
variable depicting the income tax wedge could perhaps yield different results in this piece of 
research, but this was unavailable due to constraints in data. As the data for this study is 
slightly newer, it is also possible that the importance of taxation could be in decline. This 
could be caused by the changing role of women's work, where work is seen as a legitimate 
pursuit  in  itself  instead  of  just  being  a  source  for  income.  Thus,  these  results  would  be 
consistent with decreasing wage elasticities for participation.
The variable depicting the values concerning men and women showed no consistent effect to 
gender gap in participation: As the coefficient remained statistically insignificant even at the 
10% level in three of the four models, it seems likely that values by themselves do not have a 
notable  effect  on  the  overall  gender  gap  in  labor  force  participation  in  this  formulation, 
although the  signs  of  correlation  estimates  were  as  could  be  expected.  The difference  in 
results between this piece of research and those conducted by Fortin (2005), or Algan and 
Cahuc (2005) could perhaps partly be explained by the level of analysis: Whereas the two 
pieces of research named above looked at how values affected participation at the individual 
level,  this  study was looking at  data  from a country level.  We could speculate  that  even 
though at the individual level the values would have an impact on the choice of participation, 
this would be overcome by institutional structures at the aggregate level. Finally, if we assume 
that values change rather slowly, the time frame of this particular piece of research may have 
been too short to capture a significant change in values, resulting in statistical insignificance 
in the final estimation results. Although the variable for values was consistently statistically 
significant  for  the  25-to-54-year-olds,  there  were  some  indications  that  there  might  be 
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differences in this respect if we look at the gender gap for smaller age groups: The variable is  
statistically significant for the 25-to34-year-olds at the 10% confidence level and for the 45-
to-54-year-olds at the 1% level. Although statistically insignificant, the variable displays a 
negative coefficient  estimate for the 35-to-45-year-olds which runs against  our intuition30. 
Thus it seems that people in the middle bracket are less likely to adapt their labor market 
behavior  for  the  persisting  values.  It  is  possible  that  this  is  caused  by a  higher  relative 
importance of other constraints, such as taking care of the children. The strong impact for 
older  people  is  easier  to  explain.  As  values  change  slowly  and  can  be  at  least  partially 
internalized, older people are less likely to respond to overall change in values. Thus, the 
traditional gender division of labor will likely persist for the older age groups until they are 
gradually replaced by new generations.
When looking at  the variable  concerning human capital,  we can see that countries where 
gender gap in primary education is small also tend to have small gaps in participation. The 
change in gap in this respect is mainly driven by changes in women's participation, whereas 
men's participation levels are rather unresponsive. The relationship between gaps in primary 
school labor force participations, however,  does not hold for gender gaps in secondary or 
tertiary education, or for average schooling years as a whole. These results imply that there is 
a minimum amount of skills required in the labor markets, and these are satisfied by primary 
education. Educating oneself further does not yield any additional benefits in participation, 
although it most likely impacts wages. There are, however, two other possible explanations 
for  this  phenomenon.  First,  young  girls  or  their  parents  can  decide  their  schooling 
participation based on future opportunities in the labor markets. With little opportunities, there 
is no point in attending school. As the future productivities of workers are, however, not well 
known at  young age,  this  explanation  is  not  necessarily  very credible.  A second way to 
explain this effect is to assume that there is a third variable, such as conception about the 
proper  role  of  women,  which  affects  both  primary  school  attendance  and  labor  force 
participation. It is also noteworthy that the correlation coefficient for the variable is large: 
decreasing this gap in education by one year would result in an over 20 percentage point 
decrease  in  participation.  Thus,  gender  gap  in  primary  education  is  a  significant  factor 
explaining the gap in participation. As with the variable depicting values, the effect of gap in 
primary schooling is statistically significant for the youngest and the oldest age groups, with 
30 Additional testing yields that for this age group, the signs of the coefficient estimates are counter-intuitive for 
both men and women, although remaining statistically insignificant.
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the strongest effect for the latter. It should be noted, however, that this variable is very close to 
being statistically significant at the 10% level also for the groups of 35-to-44-year-olds. The 
reasons behind this divergence are likely to be similar as well: people from the middle-bracket 
are more constrained by other matters than the young and the old, and the oldest age group is 
most responsive because of its higher variance.
The general characteristics of the labor markets can also have an impact on the gender gap in 
participation.  However,  the  role  of  unemployment  remains  somewhat  unclear,  as  its 
coefficient  estimate  is  statistically  significant  only in  OLS-  and Newey-West-estimations. 
Again, the effect of unemployment rate is mainly driven by changes in women's participation 
figures. The sign of the coefficient estimates are consistently positive as expected, implying 
that women are more likely to exit the labor markets in times of economic difficulty. There 
can be different explanations for this phenomenon. First, women could be more concentrated 
to such positions and/or fields in the labor market that are more susceptible to layoffs in hard 
times. Contributing factors here could be women's higher likelihood for working part-time, or 
the crowding of different genders to different industries. It is also possible that women may 
face discrimination in layoffs. Another possibility is that women could have more options 
outside the labor markets, prompting them to leave instead of staying in the labor markets as 
unemployed. For example, women might be more likely than men to become stay-at-home 
parents if they become unemployed. In any case, the correlation coefficients are relatively 
small, implying that only significant changes in unemployment would affect gender gap in 
participation considerably. 
Flexibility of labor market practices, proxied here by the prevalence of part-time employment 
in  a  given  country,  seems  to  decrease  the  gender  gap  in  participation  as  the  coefficient 
estimates are consistently negative in all of the estimations. The coefficient are also fairly 
large is size, telling us that the availability of part-time employment is important in explaining 
the gap in participation. High availability of part-time employment drives up the labor force 
participation of both genders, but its effect is significantly stronger for women. This implies 
that women remain more responsible for household work, as they still  need more flexible 
arrangements in order to participate in the formal labor markets. When studying different age 
groups, we can see that the availability of part-time work does not impact the youngest group. 
This  implies  that  younger  people  have  a  more  equitable  division  of  household  labor. 
Furthermore, the lower prevalence of children in this age group is probably also a contributing 
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factor, as it allows both men and women to work without additional arrangements. Again, the 
importance of the variable continues to increase with age. Thus, it seems that the stickiness of 
the learned division of labor overrides the actual demand for household labor: Otherwise the 
age group of  35-to-44-year-olds should be most  impacted by the availability of  part-time 
employment, as they are most likely to have young children at home.
There is also some evidence as to the effect of the average job tenure on participation: It has a 
statistically significant impact on participation in OLS-estimation, Prais-Winsten estimation 
and estimation with Newey-West  standard errors.   However,  the  magnitude  of  this  effect 
remains fairly small. When disaggregated by gender, we can see that the average length of the 
job  tenure  has  no  statistically  significant  impact  on  women's  participation  with  positive 
coefficient  estimates,  but  decreases  men's  participation.  Thus,  the  overall  effect  of  high 
average job tenures on gender gap in participation is negative. The results speak against the 
idea that women would participate more in countries relying in a less specific set of skills, as 
this would imply a high participation gaps in countries with high average job tenures. Instead, 
this connection could be related to the flexibility of labor markets: High average job tenure 
would imply low flexibility which would allow women to retain their jobs when giving birth. 
This would also explain why high average job tenure drive down men's participation figures, 
if inflexible labor markets are likely to discourage participation for men.
Employment protection ratio was found to have a statistically significant impact on the gender 
gap  only  in  Prais-Winsten  estimation,  so  we  should  not  put  too  much  emphasis  on  it.  
Nevertheless,  it  can  be  noted  that  the  results  imply  that  strict  employment  protection 
discourages participation for both men and women, but with a stronger effect on women. This 
could be interpreted as weak proof of discrimination in the labor markets, since it is unlikely 
that the level of employment protection would affect the supply of labor. The results could be 
caused by employers being reluctant to hire women if the laying them off would be difficult in 
the case of pregnancy.
The results concerning the effect of fertility on gender gap in participation indicate that high 
fertility rate either has a decreasing effect, or has no effect on the gender gap in labor force 
participation:  the least  conservative estimations (OLS and Prais-Winsten)  give statistically 
significant  results  for  this  variable,  whereas  the  other  two  models  remain  statistically 
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insignificant31. Although the magnitude of the effect varies considerably across specifications, 
it remain fairly small in all of them. Overall high fertility seems to be more connected to high  
levels of female participation, although it seems to also increase men's participation slightly. 
This would support the theory that for women labor force participation would act as insurance 
for  the  economic  risks  of  having  children.  However,  this  theory  seems  less  likely  when 
looking at how fertility affects the gender gaps for different age groups: again the effect is by 
far strongest for the oldest age group. As having children is rather rare for this age group, the 
connection between fertility and gender gap in participation is not straightforward. It is of 
course possible that younger age groups have observed the life of women in the older age 
groups (such as their mothers') while making fertility decisions, which would result in the 
aforementioned relation. To conclude, it seems clear that at least there is no negative relation 
between fertility and gender gap in participation. Whether there is a positive relation or no 
relation remains an open question.
Moving to the variables concerning government policies, it seems that spending on maternal 
and parental leaves is unlikely to significantly affect the gender gap. We can note that the 
signs  of  the  coefficient  estimates  are  consistently  positive,  but  the  p-values  are  also 
consistently rather large. Thus, it seems probable that the positive effect of short leaves on 
women's  labor  force  participation  are  offset  with  the  negative  effects  of  longer  leaves. 
Alternatively, it is also possible that the effect of higher spending on leaves is negligible. In 
this respect the results are similar to other pieces of research conducted on the topic. Finally, 
the results indicate that men are unlikely to take parental leaves, as the correlation coefficient 
for the variable when explaining male participation, albeit not statistically significantly.
By contrast, the results indicate that higher spending on day care should decrease gender gap 
in participation. This effect is a combination of statistically significant increases in women's 
participation, and statistically insignificant decreases in men's participation. When looking at 
smaller age groups, we can see that spending on day care has a statistically significant effect 
only on the group of 35-to-44-year-olds. This is not surprising, as women from this age group 
are quite likely to have children. Somewhat surprisingly the effect of the day care variable is 
not statistically significant for the age group of 25-to-34-year-olds. This implies that women 
most  likely  to  take  advantage  of  day  care  opportunities  also  give  birth  at  an  older  age. 
31 Estimation with Newey-West standard errors is, however, very close to being statistically significant at the 
10% level with a p-value of 0.103.
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However, it is also possible that the youngest portion of the youngest age group does not have 
children old enough to participate in day care which would result in a statistical insignificance 
of the coefficient estimate for the whole group. The overall efficiency of day care spending 
seems somewhat reasonable in the light of coefficient estimates, assuming that some of the 
spending is recouped by the increased tax revenue caused by women's higher participation. 
Overall the results are thus in line with other literature conducted on the topic.
As expected, a high marriage rate increases gender gap in participation mostly by decreasing 
women's labor force participation. This is consistent with the general pattern where married 
women's participation figures are lower than those of non-married ones. Thus, the results can 
be interpreted as further proof of the existence of gendered division of labor. The effect is 
most visible for the age group of 45-to-54-year-olds, as the coefficient estimates for the two 
younger groups are not statistically significant at the 10% level. As with a number of variables 
presented above, this implies stronger preference for traditional gender roles among  older 
people, as the values prevalent in their youth continue to stick.
Finally, a high divorce rate is associated with a low gap in participation. When comparing the 
coefficient estimates with those of marriage rate, we can see that the prevalence of divorce is 
the more important factor of the two. The relationship between divorce rates and participation 
is a combination of decreases in men's participation and increases in women's participation. 
Changes in women's participation are probably caused by switching household labor under 
marriage  to  labor  market  participation  after  divorce.  We should,  however,  remember  that 
participation  figures  themselves  could  also  affect  divorce  rates,  as  wage  income  allows 
women  to  keep  their  standard  of  living  in  the  case  of  a  divorce.  Decreases  in  men's 
participation with high divorce rates could be caused by increases in women's participation 
which could crowd part of the men out of the labor force. The divorce rates are relevant for all 
age groups but, as with some other variables, the importance is strongest for the oldest age 
group.
7 Conclusions
The purpose of this study has been to explain the variation in the gender gap in labor force 
participation across countries and time. Despite the convergence towards lower levels, the 
gender gap in LFPRs still exists practically throughout the world with considerable variation 
between the individual  countries.  It  was shown how closing the gap could yield multiple 
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benefits: Access to labor markets could be seen as a form of empowerment for women, as a 
steady stream of  income could increase women's  bargaining power within the household. 
There is also some evidence that women's access to income could be beneficial for children. 
Finally,  increased  participation  could  lead  to  an  increase  in  economy-wide  efficiency. 
Understanding the reasons behind the gender gap in participation would allow us to formulate 
better policies to realize these benefits.
Both  theoretical  and  empirical  literature  concerning  especially  variation  in  women's 
participation has been vast,  but no single factor can by itself  explain the phenomenon in 
question. It was shown that discrimination at its pure form was unlikely to be the main reason 
behind  the  gender  gap,  assuming  that  the  labor  markets  work  efficiently.  However, 
monopsonistic  power  for  employers  makes  discrimination  possible  also  in  the  long  run. 
Furthermore, frictions in the labor markets in the form of imperfect information can lead to a 
stable equilibrium where employers' beliefs of the differences between genders create a self-
fulfilling  prophecy  which  could  results  in  a  lower  participation  for  women.  Empirically 
observing labor market discrimination remains difficult as employers are unlikely to admit 
discrimination. The small number of empirical literature conducted on the topic showed us 
that some form of gender discrimination is still present in some parts of the labor markets. 
Because of the low quantity of research, making broad generalizations on the topic is not 
possible.
Besides discrimination, there are a number of models seeking to explain differences in labor 
supply across the two genders. Conventional models of labor supply assume that differences 
in wages and non-labor income are the main determinants of participation. Thus, the existence 
of a gender wage gap would results also in a gap in participation. This was shown to be at 
least  partly  true  for  women:  Compared  to  men  they  are  more  inclined  to  increase  their 
participation with rising wages. However, this difference has been disappearing over time, 
telling us that other factors must also be considered. The convergence of human capital levels 
can be seen as being an important factor in narrowing the gender gap, as it allows women 
access to a wider variety of positions. Decisions within households concerning market work 
and household work were shown to have implications for bargaining power, work decisions in 
the future, as well as on fertility. Therefore, access to labor market is important for the gender 
equality also in a larger sense. It was also shown that having children does not nowadays 
necessarily impede women's participation.
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Different policy measures can also impact women's participation and thus the gender gap. 
When compared to treating households as a unit of taxation, a system of individual income 
taxation  was  shown to  significantly  increase  women's  participation.  The  effect  of  formal 
maternal  leave  policies  was  shown to  depend  on the  duration  of  the  leave:  Short  leaves 
increased participation by allowing women to easily reattach themselves to the labor markets 
after giving birth. Long leaves, however, decreased women's participation as women would 
take longer to return to the labor markets. Child care costs also had an impact on participation, 
allowing governments to support working women with child care subsidies. However, this 
effect was overall relatively small. It was also shown that certain technological advances have 
historically been instrumental in the increasing women's participation figures. Such crucial 
technologies include advanced home appliances, oral contraceptives, infant feeding formula 
and advances in maternal health. Finally, we showed some evidence as to how cultural norms 
cam also influence participation decisions.
The  empirical  part  of  this  study examined  how some of  the  aforementioned  factors  had 
influenced the gender gap in LFPRs in a group of European OECD countries from the middle 
of the 1990s onwards. We showed that the variation in the gender gap in LFPRs is mainly 
caused by the variation in women's participation levels.  At the macro level, variation in the 
gender  gap in  primary schooling,  the  availability  of  part  time  work and the  government 
spending on day care were most conclusively shown to have an effect on the gender gap in 
LFPRs. The results indicate that closing the gender gap in primary education might be the 
most efficient way in closing the gap in participation. It was also shown that the impact of the 
various measures are often stronger for older people.  This implies that generational shifts 
should drive gender gap down in the future.
This study offers some ideas as to how the gender gap in LFPRs could be further narrowed in 
the future. Although childbearing and -rearing no longer means an almost definite exit from 
the  labor  markets  for  women,  improving  the  compatibility  between  having  children  and 
continuing market work would still be beneficial. It seems that subsidizing day care would be 
the most  efficient  way of  managing this.  Promoting  education  for  women would  also be 
extremely useful, especially if women are unlikely to complete their primary education. When 
applicable, a switch from family taxation to individual taxation could also be used as a budget 
neutral  way  of  promoting  women's  participation.  Although  gender  gap  in  labor  force 
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participation has narrowed almost constantly in the last 30 years, it is unlikely to disappear 
completely in the near future: The stickiness of values concerning the role of women in the 
labor markets is likely to make the gender gap persist yet for quite some time. 
Despite the vast number of research conducted on the topic, there are still areas where further 
study is needed. First, more research is needed on the gender gap in non-OECD countries, as 
they have been seriously underrepresented thus far. The problem of having reliable data is 
likely, however, to impede this line of inquiry also in the future. Secondly, research looking at 
the extent of gender discrimination in the labor markets has been rather sparse, leaving us 
unable to make any reasonable generalizations on the topic. The lack of longitudinal research 
on  discrimination  is  especially  problematic  in  this  respect.  Finally,  additional  research 
concerning how values and technology can affect the gender gap in LFPRs could also be 
beneficial, as these topics have just recently been taken up by economists.
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Appendix I: Graphs on LFPRs for Men and Women across Age Groups
Source: OECD 2010/I.
Source: OECD 2010/I.
Figure 10: LFPR for Men across Age Groups 1968-2009
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Figure 11: LFPR for Women across Age Groups 1968-2009
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Appendix II: Additional Descriptive Statistics and Regression Results
Table 7: Effects of Gender Gaps in Different Schooling Levels for Gender Gap in LFPRs
p-value p-value p-value p-value
Income tax
0.0772 0.556 0.1588 0.293 0.1727 0.217 0.1282 0.361
[0.1287] [0.1468] [0.1353] [0.1370]
Values
2.1712 0.306 2.7610 0.225 1.1577 0.671 1.2049 0.646
[2.0620] [2.2039] [2.6804] [2.5796]
22.6888** 0.027 2.0277 0.523 9.0000 0.123 3.6527 0.192
[9.4621] [3.1123] [5.5759] [2.6983]
0.2462 0.128 0.4267*** 0.003 0.4259*** 0.006 0.4117*** 0.005
[0.1549] [0.1259] [0.1362] [0.1282]
-0.6711** 0.019 -0.6048* 0.062 -0.6958** 0.036 -0.5887* 0.078
[0.2624] [0.3055] [0.3078] [0.3163]
-1.3714 0.148 -1.9919* 0.081 -2.1286* 0.074 -1.7627* 0.076
[0.9100] [1.0803] [1.1247] [0.9385]
0.5807 0.502 1.5429 0.307 1.4812 0.316 1.2115 0.352
[0.8483] [1.4687] [1.4395] [1.2693]
Total fertility rate
-3.6969 0.247 -4.3344 0.144 -3.9208 0.184 -3.8615 0.188
[3.0956] [2.8440] [2.8468] [2.8253]
1.7111 0.531 -0.0073 0.998 -0.4117 0.879 0.0644 0.981
[2.6816] [2.6387] [2.6592] [2.6216]
Day care
-2.1181* 0.093 -1.0850 0.264 -0.6899 0.574 -1.4778 0.137
[1.1994] [0.9434] [1.2046] [0.9522]
Marriage rate
1.1893* 0.094 1.2728* 0.098 1.4358* 0.053 1.3284* 0.069
[0.6739] [0.7310] [0.6958] [0.6896]
Divorce rate
-2.7369*** 0.002 -3.6992*** 0.005 -3.5901*** 0.004 -3.3313*** 0.005
[0.7702] [1.1659] [1.0936] [1.0386]
0.7123 0.6598 0.6696 0.6763
Statistical significance: *** 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level
Standard errors in brackets below the corresponding correlation coefficients
Dependent variable: Gender gap in LFPRs for the age group of 25-54
Linear regression, robust 
standard errors adjusted 
for country-clusters 
(#primary)
Linear regression, robust 
standard errors adjusted 
for country-clusters 
(#secondary)
Linear regression, robust 
standard errors adjusted 
for country-clusters 
(#tertiary)
Linear regression, robust 
standard errors adjusted 
for country-clusters 
(#total)
Coefficient 
estimate
Coefficient 
estimate
Coefficient 
estimate
Coefficient 
estimate
Gender gap in 
schooling #
Unemployment 
rate
Part time 
employment
Average job 
tenure
Employment 
protection ratio
Maternal and 
parental leave
R2
Table 8: Variable Correlations
Table 9: Explaining Men's LFPR
Dependent variable: Men's LFPR for the age group of 25-54
OLS regression
p-value p-value p-value p-value
Income tax
0.0342 0.236 0.0341 0.477 0.0342 0.361 0.0091 0.722
[0.0288] [0.0471] [0.0373] [0.0255]
Values
1.1777* 0.050 1.1777 0.330 1.1777 0.274 0.2351 0.767
[0.5964] [1.1770] [1.0731] [0.7950]
-0.9086 0.399 -0.9086 0.399 -0.9086 0.494 -0.2040 0.808
[1.0746] [1.0529] [1.3259] [0.8408]
0.0278 0.292 0.0278 0.511 0.0278 0.386 0.0326 0.251
[0.0263] [0.0415] [0.0320] [0.0285]
0.0735** 0.033 0.0735* 0.087 0.0735** 0.033 0.0521* 0.075
[80.0342] [0.0408] [0.0343] [0.0293]
-0.3384** 0.018 -0.3384 0.125 -0.3384** 0.044 -0.2418* 0.056
[0.1417] [0.2110] [0.1667] [0.1266]
-0.2241 0.212 -0.2241 0.393 -0.2241 0.223 -0.2220 0.201
[0.1792] [0.2564] [0.1833] [0.1736]
Total fertility rate
1.4965** 0.024 1.4965 0.169 1.4965* 0.069 1.0035 0.175
[0.6605] [1.0462] [0.8188] [0.7395]
0.4896 0.353 0.4896 0.397 0.4896 0.487 0.3745 0.560
[0.5262] [0.5649] [0.7027] [0.6426]
Day care
-0.4271 0.159 -0.4271 0.316 -0.4271 0.248 -0.3379 0.238
[0.3021] [0.4149] [0.3684] [0.2862]
Marriage rate
0.1466 0.245 0.1466 0.332 0.1466 0.290 0.1883* 0.099
[0.1257] [0.1473] [0.1383] [0.1141]
Divorce rate
-0.3644** 0.032 -0.3644** 0.018 -0.3644** 0.044 -0.1987 0.138
[0.1693] [0.1414] [0.1800] [0.1340]
0.2298 0.2298 0.2298 1.0000
Statistical significance: *** 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level
Standard errors in brackets below the corresponding correlation coefficients
Linear regression, robust 
standard errors adjusted 
for country-clusters
Linear regression with 
Newey-West standard 
errors
Prais-Winsten 
regression, robust 
standard errors, panel-
specific AR(1) 
autocorrelation
Coefficient 
estimate
Coefficient 
estimate
Coefficient 
estimate
Coefficient 
estimate
Gender Gap in 
primary schooling
Unemployment 
rate
Part time 
employment
Average job 
tenure
Employment 
protection ratio
Maternal and 
parental leave
R2
Table 10: Explaining Women's LFPR
Dependent variable: Women's LFPR for the age group of 25-54
OLS regression
p-value p-value p-value p-value
Income tax
-0.0430 0.659 -0.0430 0.763 -0.0430 0.697 -0.0665 0.367
[0.0972] [0.1405] [0.1103] [0.0737]
Values
-0.9936 0.622 -0.9936 0.583 -0.9936 0.616 -3.8743** 0.014
[2.0146] [1.7775] [1.9778] [1.5730]
-23.5974*** p<0.001 -23.5974** 0.020 -23.5974*** p<0.001 -22.1902*** p<0.001
[3.6299] [9.2611] [6.2041] [4.0977]
-0.2184** 0.015 -0.2184 0.165 -0.2184** 0.044 -0.0803 0.264
[0.0889] [0.1514] [0.1078] [0.0719]
0.7446*** p<0.001 0.7446** 0.014 0.7446*** p<0.001 0.5459*** p<0.001
[0.1156] [0.2751] [0.1714] [0.1006]
1.0331** 0.032 1.0331 0.306 1.0331 0.100 0.3618 0.288
[0.4787] [0.9816] [0.6264] [0.3409]
-0.8048 0.185 -0.8048 0.415 -0.8048 0.194 -1.1832*** 0.005
[0.6052] [0.9655] [0.6178] [0.4184]
Total fertility rate
5.1933** 0.021 5.1933 0.176 5.1933** 0.046 8.043*** p<0.001
[2.2313] [3.6919] [2.5866] [1.6813]
-1.2215 0.493 -1.2215 0.657 -1.2215 0.539 -2.1992* 0.086
[1.7775] [2.7057] [1.9847] [1.2802]
Day care
1.691* 0.099 1.6910 0.186 1.691* 0.063 2.2224*** p<0.001
[1.0206] [1.2323] [0.9061] [0.6298]
Marriage rate
-1.0428** 0.015 -1.0428 0.158 -1.0428** 0.035 -0.8431*** 0.002
[0.4247] [0.7095] [0.4924] [0.2709]
Divorce rate
2.3725*** p<0.001 2.3725** 0.010 2.3725*** 0.002 1.1231*** 0.006
[0.5720] [0.8234] [0.7539] [0.4088]
0.6781 0.6781 0.6781 0.9993
Statistical significance: *** 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level
Standard errors in brackets below the corresponding correlation coefficients
Linear regression, robust 
standard errors adjusted 
for country-clusters
Linear regression with 
Newey-West standard 
errors
Prais-Winsten 
regression, robust 
standard errors, panel-
specific AR(1) 
autocorrelation
Coefficient 
estimate
Coefficient 
estimate
Coefficient 
estimate
Coefficient 
estimate
Gender gap in 
primary schooling
Unemployment 
rate
Part time 
employment
Average job 
tenure
Employment 
protection ratio
Maternal and 
parental leave
R2
